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ARTICLES

FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO AND BACK TO THE
UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW'S EFFECT ON DOMESTIC LAW
Joel B. Eisen*
We Americans think we're so darned smart. We invented
modern environmental law, developed its sophisticated "command-and-control" structure,1 got the public involved as never
before in fighting corporate polluters,2 and achieved measurable
successes by getting lead out of our air3 and bald eagles back

* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Center of
Environmental Law, University of Richmond School of Law; B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., Stanford Law School. I thank the family and friends of
George E. Allen for making this intellectual journey a rich and rewarding one. Much
credit is due to my Allen Chair colleagues-Professor Ben Boer, Professor Edith
Brown Weiss, Professor Beatriz Bugeda, and ·Professor Philippe Sands-for their energetic involvement with the Allen family and the law school community, and for their
lively and creative demonstrations of the richness and vitality of international environmental law. I also thank the University of Richmond School of Law for its generous financial support of my research, and John Dembach and my colleagues, Michael
Allan Wolf and W. Wade Berryhill for their invaluable assistance and comments on
earlier drafts of this article. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my
editor for life, Tamar Schwartz Eisen. The ideas and opinions expressed herein are
my own, and I am responsible for any errors or omissions.
1. The system of "command and control" regulation is so named because its statutes and regulations "impose detailed, legally enforceable limits, conditions, and affirmative requirements on industrial operations, generally controlling sources that generate pollution on an individual basis." Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command To SelfControl, 22 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 103, 104 (1998).
2. See infra Part II (discussing the importance of public participation in environmental law).
3. Levels of lead in the nation's ambient air declined 96% between 1970 and
1987 as a result of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) rules phasing
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from near extinction. 4 We've even tried "second generation"
tools such as emissions trading systems5 and incentive-based
regulatory flexibility approaches when we discovered our
system's limitations. 6 Not that we've got it all figured out,

down the amount of lead allowed in gasoline. See C.E.Q. 20th ANN. REP. 8 (1989).
For a discussion of the EPA's regulations, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 947-52 (1994).
Professor McGarity's description of the complicated fifteen-year history of these regulations is an excellent case study of wrangling among special interest groups, administrative agencies, and the courts. See id.
4. In 1963, there were only 417 nesting pairs of bald eagles in the nation. In
1994, there were over 4,000, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) downgraded the bald eagle from "endangered" to "threatened" status. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.ll(h)
(1998). The continued recovery of the bald eagle population led the FWS to consider
proposing the removal of the bald eagle from the list altogether. See James
Gerstenzang, Eagle May Fly From Nest of Endangered, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1998, at
Al; see also Lois J. Schiffer & Ann C. Juliano, Reform of Environmental Regulations:
Three Points, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 175, 175 (1998) (counting recovery of endangered species such as the bald eagle as a success story of environmental regulatory programs).
5. For example, Title IV of the Clean Air Act, added by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-71q (1994), created the well-known, marketbased system for trading sulfur dioxide allowances. See generally James E. Krier,
Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1994); Henry E. Mazurek,
Jr., The Future of Clean Air: The Application of Futures Markets to Title N of the
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (1994).
6. A good example of a flexible approach to an "inflexible" environmental statute
is the "no surprises" policy under the Endangered Species Act CESA). See 16 U.S.C. §
1531-44 (1994). Section 9 of the ESA proscribes any "taking" of a listed endangered
animal. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(l)(B), 1532(19) (1994) (defining "take" broadly as
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct"). A private landowner may apply for an "incidental take" permit under section lO(a) of the ESA for a taking "incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity," in return for
adopting a habitat conservation plan (HCP) designed to protect the species. See 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (1994). Under the "no surprises" policy, the landowner receives
a promise that the government will pay for any additional conservation measures required if unforeseen consequences occur. See No Surprises Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 29,091
(1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(5)-(6), 17.32(b)(5)-(6), 222.22(g)-(h)); J.B.
Ruhl, While the Cat's Asleep: The Making of the "New" ESA, 12 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 187, 188-190 (1998) (describing the "no surprises" policy); Joseph L. Sax, New
Departures For Land And Water: Concluding Perspectives on Ecosystem Management,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1997) (discussing the HCP process and the "no surprises" policy).
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mind you, 7 but we're inclined to think of ourselves as world
leaders when it comes to environmental protection.
We've created a massive bureaucracy to administer an unwieldy system of environmental laws that rivals the tax code
for sheer complexity.8 We are busy playing the endgame of
environmental law's first three decades, tallying up our
system's achievements,9 excoriating its inconsistencies and failures to regulate this pollutant or that activity, 10 debating with
each other about its future, 11 and simply working out the bugs

7. Virtually since the creation of the environmental regulatory system, there has
been a lively discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. For an early debate, compare Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985), which criticizes command and control systems, with
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1985),
which criticizes the opponents of command and control regulation.
8. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the
Complexity of the Environmental Laws, 22 ENVTL. L. 417, 420 (1992) (providing a
humorous look at the complex "hydra-headed nature of the modern environmental
laws"). For the direct comparison to tax law, see Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution At Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 411 (1995) (stating that "[a] few
experiences with environmental law can make the tax code seem like a walk in the
park").
9. See generally Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law:
What's Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549 (1991) (detailing
achievements and challenges in laws controlling air pollution); William H. Rodgers,
Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1009 (1994) (praising section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA), and other successful environmental laws).
Of course, some also take on the task of defending these achievements against
those who would roll back environmental laws. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Civic Values Confronting Market Force
Dynamics in a Time of Counter-Revolution, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 733 (1996)
(describing rollback initiatives in the 104th Congress); Joseph L. Sax, The Second
Annual Lloyd K Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law: Using Property Rights to
Attack Environmental Protection, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Population, Consumption and Environment
Law, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 89, 89 (1997) (claiming that environmental laws
"have failed to deal effectively with many problems"). According to Professor Reitze,
"[s]ignificant wetland and wildlife habitat losses continue; the natural forests in the
United States are disappearing; most urban areas fail to meet one or more air quality standards; and global warming has not been seriously addressed." Id. He also
advocates action to deal with the "failure to understand the holistic interrelationship
of environmental degradation to population and consumption." Id.; see also Arnold W.
Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It Is Time For A New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 111 (1989).
11. See Steinzor, supra note 1 (discussing "reinvention initiatives" such as Project
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in the system. 12 It should come as no surprise that many of us
pay little attention to international environmental law. 13 It
isn't that we believe it is unnecessary. We acknowledge a role
for international solutions in curbing transboundary pollution, a
straight-forward ex.tension of the notion that pollution knows no
boundaries. 14 But overwhelmingly, we think of international
XL); see also Robert V. Percival, Responding to Environmental Risk: A Pluralistic
Perspective, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 526 (1997) (discussing reasons for "efforts to
'reinvent regulation'"); 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T (1997) (a collection of articles
discussing regulatory reform). Beyond the initiatives designed to achieve regulatory
reform, there are frequent calls to overhaul various statutes or regulatory regimes.
These are so numerous that I will spare the reader the tedium of a list.
Some of the freshest contemporary salvos in the reinvention debate are the
innovative works advocating new organizing principles or frameworks for a next generation of environmental law. See generally John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1998)
(advocating reform of existing laws and institutions based upon principles of sustainable development); Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of
the Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 463; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Haus. L. REV. 933 (1997) (applying the theory
of complex adaptive systems to environmental law and describing how it might be
revolutionized to comport with this theory).
12. A good example of the gaps, inconsistencies, and other shortcomings of modern environmental regulation is the haphazard regulation of "toxic" and "hazardous"
pollutants under the various pollution control statutes. See John C. Dernbach, The
Unfocused Regulation of Toxic and Hazardous Pollutants, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(1997).
Even when we think we have solved a problem, it may nevertheless reemerge.
See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Myth: Evaluating LongTerm Environmental Settlements, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 567 (1995) (describing problems
with "settling" environmental disputes).
13. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of International Environmental Law
On United States Pollution Control Law, 21 VT. L. REV. 759, 760 (1997) (noting that
"United States environmental law has . . . as a whole, ignored the relationship between domestic and international environmental law, and most lawyers have paid
little attention to the possibility that international law could influence the content of
our law").
14. A frequently asserted justification for domestic environmental law is the curbing of interjurisdictional spillovers. Among the first to advocate this proposition was
Professor Richard Stewart. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196, 1226-30 (1977) (stating that federal controls are necessary to prevent
spillover effects); infra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the perception that
the Trial Smelter decision held transboundary pollution unlawful); see also Daniel C.
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 593, 626-27
(1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342-43 (1996).
After the adoption of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2
of the Rio Declaration, it is now "widely recognized to reflect customary international
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environmental law as a largely sanctionless creation "full of
sound and fury, signifying nothing,"15 the 'jurisprudential
equivalent of vaporware."16
I imagine most environmental lawyers have heard of the
Montreal Protocol17 or the recent global climate change agreement, 18 though I suspect few could tell you much about how

law" that nations have a responsibility to not cause transboundary pollution. Philippe
Sands, International Environmental Law: An Introductory Overview, in GREENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW xv, xv (P. Sands ed., 1994); see also Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Presentation by Dr. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO
CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNlvERSARY OF THE COURT 398, 401 (Connie Peck & R.S. Lee
eds., 1997); Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in the
United States and the European Union, 54 MD. L. REV. 1658, 1659 (1995) (discussing
the importance of multijurisdictional solutions to international transboundary pollution
problems); Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" In International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 537, 537 (1997); Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency
of Environmental Regulation and Public Participation in the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1127, 1128 (1995) ("Pollution
does not respect national borders. Therefore, we see an increasingly international
emphasis on global commons and cross-border pollution prevention and clean-up."); A.
Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J.
37, 44 (1997) ("The environmental case against exclusive national sovereignty [over
resources] rests on the scientific and economic argument that unacceptable levels of
transboundary and global spillovers exist. . . ."). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden
Rules For Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 934 (1997) (arguing that regulation of transboundary pollution at the domestic and international level is "underdeveloped").
15. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act V, sc. 5.
16. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1283, 1314 (1997). "Vaporware" is the term for the widespread practice in the
computer industry of announcing products not yet (and maybe never) ready for the
marketplace. See Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real
Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 1163, 1163 n.2 (1996).
17. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), 26 I.L.M. 1541, 1550
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see also Dale S.
Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer, 15
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 275 (1991). The Montreal Protocol, "perhaps the most widely
cited and analyzed [international] environmental agreement," is probably the most
familiar agreement to domestic lawyers. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 543.
18. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; see also Charlotte
Booncharoen & John Gase, International Commitment Toward Curbing Global Warming: The Kyoto Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 917 (1998); William K Stevens, Meeting
Reaches Accord to Reduce Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at Al (discussing provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and predicting difficulty in ratification by the
U.S. Senate).
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they work. Beyond that, knowledge about international environmental law is probably thin. Consider this series of lawyerly
followup questions about any treaty: 19 What substantive and
procedural obligations does it impose on signatories such as the
United States? Is there a regulatory agency comparable to the
EPA that supervises the agreement? Do we do what we're supposed to do under the agreement?20 If not, who (if anyone) can
do something about it? How successful has the agreement been
in achieving its goals?21
I doubt most environmental lawyers could answer these questions; a year ago, I would not have put my knowledge of international environmental law to this test. Like others, I tended to
think this body of law was rather ineffectual and wholly separate from domestic environmental law. 22 I confess to having
been mistaken. The recent and rapid developments in international environmental law can influence our domestic system of
environmental law. We should abandon any conceptual separation of the two bodies of law, and instead think of the two as
having evolved into a new relationship in which international
environmental law can and does play a role in the development
and refinement of domestic law. 23
International environmental law is maturing into a remarkably sophisticated body of law that is increasingly becoming

19. In posing this question, of course, I have left aside the role that customary
international law plays in safeguarding the environment. See Sands, supra note 14, at
xxii ("The primary role of treaties and acts of international organizations should not
obscure the important-albeit secondary-role played by customary international
law.").
·
20. Professor Edith Brown Weiss terms this an inquiry regarding "compliance,"
distinguishing this question from questions of implementation and effectiveness of
international environmental agreements. See infra notes 201-09 and accompanying
text.
21. To Professor Brown Weiss, this is a question of the agreement's "effectiveness." See infra Part 11.C.1.b.
22. As Professor Brown Weiss observes, I was certainly not alone; there is a long
tradition of drawing "a sharp line between international and domestic law," but that
divide is "fading." Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance With International
Environmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1555, 155758 (1999).
23. I am indebted to Professor Ben Boer for making this observation in his public
lecture in the Allen Chair Visiting Scholars series, and to each of the Allen Professors for prompting me to explore the connection between the two systems of law. See
infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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intertwined with domestic law. I discuss this relationship in
this article, building upon lessons learned from the distinguished visiting scholars of the George E. Allen Chair in Law
at the University of Richmond School of Law for the Spring
1998 semester24 through their interaction with faculty, students of the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series, and
the law school community. Through the keen insights of these
scholars, the reader will come to see the vital and dynamic
nature of the connection between domestic and international
environmental law.
Like all associations between two complex systems, this is a
multifaceted relationship. International environmental law's
influence on the content of domestic law is perhaps the way in
which the two systems are most obviously symbiotic. 25 The
conjunction of the two occurs in a complex process. International environmental agreements often assillne a linear cause-andeffect relationship with domestic law: the agreement calls for
domestic law to be enacted to implement its provisions or conform to its norms. I caution the reader that the relationship is
not so linear as it appears, and is indeed much messier. The
interweaving between the two systems is a sort of discursive
24. The George E. Allen Chair in Law was endowed by the family and friends of
George E. Allen to honor this distinguished Virginia trial lawyer and founder of tl:ie
highly regarded civil litigation firm of Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen, based in Richmond, Virginia. The Spring 1998 semester marked the ninth year that the faculty of
the University of Richmond School of Law had the opportunity to invite eminent
figures in law and related fields to visit the law school and participate in a symposium and advanced seminar.
In 1998, the title for the symposium and course was "Resolving International
Environmental Disputes in the 1990s and Beyond." The group of four visiting scholars
and holders of the Allen Chair-Professor Beatriz Bugeda of Universidad
Iberoamericana, Mexico City, Mexico; Professor Ben Boer, University of Sydney, Australia; Professor Edith Brown Weiss, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington,
D.C.; and Professor Philippe Sands, Reader in International Law, University of London and Professor, Global Law Faculty, New York University Law School-was wellsuited to explore the future of international environmental law. Each professor is
highly qualified and well regarded, and each has extensive scholarship and practice
experience in the field of international environmental law. The professors were truly
an international contingent, hailing from Australia, Great Britain, Mexico, and the
United States. Each professor visited the law school for approximately one week,
during which the professor taught two seminar classes, gave a public presentation to
the university community, engaged in a faculty colloquy, and took part in other activities related to the course theme.
25. By this, I do not mean to imply that the two systems are locked in a dependent affiliation, but merely to suggest that there is a close relationship.
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interlocution with inadequately understood feedback mechanisms and cause-and-effect linkages.
Comparing the two legal regimes, one often does not observe
a direct cause-and-effect link between an international environmental agreement or principle and its domestic counterpart, but
instead sees frequent false starts and opportunities missed or
as yet unexplored. In his article, Professor Ben Boer demonstrates how principles developed at the world stage (in this
case, "sustainable development") can serve as a source of domestic law. The complexity involved in translating that principle into domestic law is evidenced in Professor Boer's observation that, at present, the implementation of sustainable development principles in the Asian region shows ''little consistency. "26 That principles initially developed on the international
stage can lead to domestic innovation, but only with assiduous
attention to their implementation, is also apparent in the tepid
American response to fulfill the international agenda for sustainable development. 27
Beyond influencing the content of domestic law, international
environmental law can often have enormous impact precisely
because it is an evolving regime grappling with many problems
comparable to those first addressed decades ago in the domestic
setting. This asynchronous evolution of the international environmental legal regime often takes us down the road not taken,28 yielding solutions different from and in some cases complementary to those available under domestic environmental
laws. International environmental law can also play a hortatory
role inspiring us to strengthen cherished principles in domestic
law. Both of these roles are in evidence in Professor Beatriz
Bugeda's analysis of the Cozumel Submission brought under the
Citizen's Submission process of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) environmental side agreement. 29 While

26. Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U. RICH.
L. REv. 1503, 1545 (1999).
27. See infra Part IL
28. See Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, in COLLECTED POEMS, PROSE, &
PLAYS 103 (Richard Poirer & Mark Richardson eds., 1995).
29. See Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA up to Its Green Expectations? Effective Law
Enforcement under the North American Agreement on Environmental Consideration, 32
U. RICH. L. REV. 1591, 1605-13 (1999).
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criticizing its many flaws and making suggestions for improvement, Professor Bugeda finds that this process creates an international forum for public input in domestic development projects. Just as importantly though, her analysis reinforces the
legitimacy of public participation in domestic fora.
The experience that actors gain in the evolution of international environmental law provides valuable lessons for the domestic setting. Scholars who sift methodically through this
experiential evidence, analyzing its trends and offering recommendations for change, develop insights useful for thinking
about complex problems in the domestic system. Professor Edith
Brown Weiss's article, based on a groundbreaking international
study of compliance by eight nations with five international
environmental agreements, debunks a "Baker's Dozen" of thirteen myths about how and why nations comply with these and
other international agreements. 30 Her analysis provides useful
principles that help explain why all actors give effect to international law, and affords tremendous insights about how domestic laws should be structured to effectuate compliance. Professor Philippe Sands focuses on international environmental
litigation and the tension it generates between nations and the
international community. His article offers insights applicable
not only in an analysis of the proper role of international tribunals, but also in the ongoing discussion of national sovereignty,
and, by analogy, in the debate over environmental federalism in
the United States. 31
In Part I, I begin my discussion of the relationship between
the two legal regimes with a brief introduction to modern international environmental law to assist those whose knowledge is
as limited as mine was not too long ago. I also describe how
the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series was designed to
facilitate exploration of major trends in international environ-

30. See generally Brown Weiss, supra note 22. For a detailed description of the
study of compliance, which Professor Brown Weiss conducted with political scientist
Harold K Jacobson and a team of international collaborators, see Edith Brown Weiss,
The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown
Weiss & Harold K Jacobson eds. 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES].
31. See generally Philippe Sands, International Environmental Litigation and Its
Future, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1619 (1999).
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mental law. Part II provides a more in-depth look at the specific relationship between domestic and international environmental law. I conclude that international environmental law informs domestic law as a wellspring of law leading to domestic
innovation, a complement to domestic law, a source of hortatory
experience, and a laboratory for experiential insights. From
time to time, I refer to the specific challenges of domestic
''brownfields" laws and policies, a subject which I have addressed in detail elsewhere.
I. RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES IN THE
1990s AND BEYOND: RECENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The integrating theme for the Spring 1998 Allen Chair series
was Resolving International Environmental Disputes in the
1990s And Beyond. Twenty-five years ago, the notion of a seminar-long scholarly series devoted to international environmental
law would have been curious at best and probably laughable at
worst. Even the most ardent supporters of international environmental law would have concluded, to quote Gertrude Stein,
that "there is no there there."32 The situation is very different
today, following a quarter century of rapid development and
evolution of the law.
A. From Stockholm to Kyoto: International Environmental Law
Grows and Matures

Most observers believe the modern era in international environmental law began at the 1972 Stockholm Conference. 33 As
in the domestic setting, however, there is a longer history of
legal activity aimed at protecting the international environment.
Professor Sands traces the genesis of international environmental law to the turn of the twentieth century. 34 He notes that
an international arbitral tribunal decision in 1893, which allowed British exploration of fur seals on the high seas, but
32. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBQDy'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
33. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972 [hereinafter Stockholm Conference].
34. See Sands, supra note 31, at 1619-21.
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prescribed regulations to protect the seals, "marked the beginning of international environmental law."35 In the twentieth
century, a number of developments predate the Stockholm Conference: the bilateral and multilateral international environmental agreements dating to the early 1900s on subjects such as
protecting wildlife,36 the well-known Trail Smelter decision of
1941,37 the 1949 UNSCCUR conference (which "sowed the
seeds for the development of legislation to address international
environmental issues"),38 and agreements negotiated in the
1950s and 1960s after UNSCCUR to address marine pollution
and other topics. 39 However, one could best describe international environmental law in this period as developing
"incrementally."40
The Stockholm Conference "placed global environmental issues firmly on the international government agenda for the first
time." 41 Conference delegates adopted a declaration of environmental principles, the "Stockholm Declaration."42 This nonbinding statement featured twenty-six general principles, two of
which, regarding states' responsibility not to cause
transboundary harms within the context of national sovereignty, 43 serve as bedrock statements of international environmen35. Id. at 1621; see also Sands, supra note 14, at xv.
36. One example of such an agreement was the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49
Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 359; see also Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J.
675, 676 (1993).
37. Philippe Sands notes that the Trail Smelter case, Trail Smelter Arbitration
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1935), which predates the development of virtually all
modem international environmental law, is frequently-and mistakenly-cited for the
proposition that transboundary pollution is unlawful under international law. See
Sands, supra note 31, at 1621-22; cf. Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 676-77.
38. Sands, supra note 31, at 1622.
39. See id. at 1623-24; Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 677-78.
40. Sands, supra note 31, at 1623.
41. Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of
National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 31
WILLAMETIE L. REV. 307, 307 (1995).
42. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. .A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
43. Principle 2 provides: "The natural resources of the earth, including the air,
water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through
careful planning or management, as appropriate." Id. at princ. 2. Principle 21 con-
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tal law. 44 The Stockholm Declaration, taken together with an
action plan embodying recommendations for specific actions,
"represented the international community's first effort at constructing a coherent strategy for the development of international policy, law, and institutions to protect the environment."45
While rapid developments were well underway even as the
Stockholm Conference took place,46 most observers believe that
Stockholm catalyzed the growth of international environmental
law.47 It can now be claimed that there is "a solid body of
rules of international environmental law."48 Sources of this law
include bilateral, regional, and multilateral treaties, "secondary
legislation" (binding and non-binding acts of international organizations),49 customary rules of international law, and nonbinding documents such as the Stockholm Declaration. 50 International environmental law incorporates broadly applicable
norms such as the "precautionary principle," calling for environmental protective measures in the absence of full scientific
certainty regarding threats of harm, 51 and "intergenerational

strains this by recognizing "the sovereign right of nations to exploit their own resources." Id. at princ. 21. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973).
44. See Sands, supra note 14, at xxxi.
45. See id.
46. "Many inlportant legal developments took place in the period sun-ounding the
[Stockholm] Conference, including negotiation of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, the London Ocean Dumping Convention, the World
Heritage Convention, and the first of the UNEP regional seas conventions." Brown
Weiss, supra note 35, at 678.
47. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 14, at xxvii.
48. Id. at xxviii; see also Brown Weiss, supra note 36 at 679. See generally
Sands, supra note 14, at xxxv-xxxviii (discussing the role of standards in modern
international environmental law).
49. Non-binding instruments are popularly known as "soft law." See generally Pi·erre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 420 (1991).
50. See generally Sands, supra note 14, at xxii-xxiii (discussing sources of modern
international environmental law).
51. This concept is enshrined in the Rio Declaration. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development June 14, 1992, UNCED Doc. A/CONF.151/Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874,
879 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; see also Boer, supra note 41, at 313. But see Frank
B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
851, 852 (1996) (describing the prominence of the precautionary principle in international and domestic environmental law, but criticizing it as "deeply perverse in its
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equity," recognizing that the needs of both present and future
generations must be taken into account in environmental policymaking. 52
There are now about 1000 bilateral, regional, and multilateral documents that contain provisions aimed at safeguarding
natural resources or curbing pollution, 53 many of which have
been adopted since Stockholm. Multiple agreements are being
developed at any given time, making it difficult for nations
simply to keep up with the negotiations. 54 As Professor Brown
Weiss has noted, the coverage and scope of these agreements
differs significantly from those of the past:
The subject matter of international environmental agreements now bears little resemblance to that in agreements
concluded in the first half of this century, which focused on
boundary rivers, fishing rights, and protection of particularly valued animal species. Today there are agreements to
control pollution in all environmental media, conserve habitats, protect global commons, such as the high-level ozone
layer, and protect resources located within countries that
are of concern to the international community. . . .
The scope of international agreements has expanded significantly since 1972: from transboundary pollution agreements
to global pollution agreements; from control of direct emissions into lakes to comprehensive river basin system regimes; from preservation of certain species to conservation
of ecosystems; from agreements that take effect only at national borders to ones that restrain resource use and control

implications for the environment and human welfare").
52. See Rio Declaration, supra note 51, princ. 3 (stating that "the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations"). Professor Brown Weiss, whose groundbreaking book on intergenerational equity, EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
FuTuRE
GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL
LAW,
COM1\10N
PATRIMONY,
AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989), maintains that present generations have a responsibility to future generations to protect the environment and notes that "sustainable
development is inherently intergenerational." Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 707. See
generally Edith Brown Weiss, Sustainable Development Symposium, A Reply to
Barresi's "Beyond Fairness to Future Generations," 11 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (1997);
Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment, 102
YALE L.J. 2123 (1993).
53. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1555.
54. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 679; Sands, supra note 14, at xxx.
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activities within national borders, such as for world heritages, wetlands, and biologically diverse areas. 55

International agreements increasingly embody sophisticated
regulatory techniques, including specific obligations to reduce
pollution or conserve resources that impose responsibilities on
nations beyond those found in domestic environmental law.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, for example, the United States would
have to reduce its emissions of specified gases thought to contribute to global warming by 7% from 1990 levels in the 20082012 timeframe. 56 Another example of increasing complexity is
the recognition of the relationship between trade and the environment, long ignored, in the context of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). 57 The breadth and depth of international
environmental law was in evidence twenty years after Stockholm, when the international community gathered for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED or Rio Conference), in Rio de Janeiro. The Convention
on the Conservation of Biological Diversity and Framework
Convention on Climate Change were opened for signature, and
the delegates approved the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development58 and the far-reaching Agenda 21. 59
Put all these agreements, standards, principles, prescriptions
and legal techniques together, and a fairly consistent picture
emerges. Once "marginal," environmental issues have become "a
central concern of the UN, GATT and other international institutions, and to all governments."60 As one observer notes, the
proliferation of international environmental law means that "we
55. Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 679-81; see id. at 680-81 (listing international
and regional agreements negotiated between 1985 and 1992).
56. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 3 (imposing obligation on countries
listed in Annex I) and Annex I (listing the United States with a 7% reduction target).
57. See Sands, supra note 14, at xii; see generally John H. Jackson, World Trade
Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Confiict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1227 (1992). The body of literature on NAFTA and GAIT is expanding rapidly. See
infra note 102 and accompanying text (listing articles discussing the dispute resolution process under NAFTA's environmental side agreement).
58. See Rio Declaration, supra note 51.
59. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda Item 21,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/PC/100/Add.l (1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
60. Sands, supra note 14, at xxx.
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may be in the early stages of the development of a genuine
regime of international environmental protection." 61 Still, international environmental law is not yet as sophisticated as that
of the United States or Europe. It is a "fledgling," growing and
maturing but still in its formative stages. 62 In its path of development stands a host of challenges. With power dispersed
among secretariats and other bodies, there is no coordinated
home for international environmental regulatory authority. 63
Mechanisms for non-governmental organizations (NG0s)64 or
private citizens to participate in international environmental
decision making are currently limited. There are problems with
implementation of and compliance with international environmental agreements. At present, nations rarely resort to official
dispute resolution fora to address international environmental
conflicts, and when they do, the results are not encouraging.
As Professor Sands has noted, there is lingering doubt about
international environmental law's future:
Despite impressive achievements, there is reason to doubt
that this body of law will have significant impact on actual
governmental and human [behavior]. Limited implementation and enforcement suggests that international environmental law remains in its formative stages. Law-making is

61. Farber, supra note 16, at 1316. As Professor Brown Weiss observes, some
scholars would disagree, particularly "those in the Realist School [who] question the
relevance of international law at all." Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1559-60 (footnote omitted).
62. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 707; Sands, supra note 14, at xxx; see
also Sanford E. Gaines, Global and Regional Perspectiues on International Enuironmental Protection, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 983, 983-84 (1997).
In spite of its roots in the early years of the twentieth century, international environmental law is still immature. Its rapid but helter-skelter
growth in recent years marks a movement still in its adolescent phase,
with all the energy, tension, hope, and fear of that time of life, and all
its vulnerability to outside influences.
Id.
63. See Sands, supra note 14, at xxx.
64. For the purposes of this article, NGOs are "private organizations that are
directly engaged in influencing international environmental law." Raustiala, supra
note 14, at 541; see generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Gouernmental Organizations in the Deuelopment of International Enuironmental Law, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REv.
61 (1992). NGOs are comparable to public interest groups in domestic environmental
law. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Gouernance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 186-87 (1997) (noting that the definition
of an NGO is rather fluid).
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decentralized, with legislative initiatives being developed in
literally dozens of different intergovernmental organizations
at the global, regional, and sub-regional level. Coordination
among the initiatives is inadequate, leading to measures
which are often duplicative and sometimes inconsistent.
Moreover, the law-making process tends to be reactive and
ad hoc in nature, often vulnerable to the vagaries of political, economic, and scientific events and findings. 65

B. Allen Chair Professors Assess International Environmental
Law's Progress
Professor Sands's appraisal, while accurate today, might have
a short shelf life. As is the case domestically, developments in
international environmental law now occur rapidly. Delegates in
Japan adopted the Kyoto Protocol less than one month before
the Law School's Spring 1998 semester began. The NAFTA
machinery is less than five years old; until the end of 1997, no
case had proceeded to the conclusion of the Citizen's Submission process under its environmental side agreement. Professor
Brown Weiss has identified specific changes taking place in this
body of law. Nations negotiate and conclude international environmental agreements more quickly: "[i]t is now rare for countries to need more than two years to negotiate even complicated, detailed international agreements." 66 Negotiators create
mechanisms to promote flexibility in responding to improved
scientific understanding, and have directed their attention increasingly to protecting ecosystems rather than protecting
against individual harms. 67 There is increased attention to the
impact of treaties on nonparties, and broadening of public input
in the development and enforcement of international environmental agreements. 68 With the emergence of increasingly detailed agreements, 69 parties are fashioning creative methods of
ensuring implementation and compliance.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Sands, supra note 14, at xxx.
Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 685-86.
See id. at 688-91.
See id. at 691-94.
See id. at 696.
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As Professor Sands observed, international environmental law
has "grown from a body of national and bilateral rules into an
area increasingly governed by regional and global obligations,
including enforceable standards."70 The Allen Chair seminar
series considered some of this development's far-reaching implications. Rather than focus exclusively on one treaty or environmental medium, the seminar series was designed as a crosscutting examination of major trends in the evolution of international environmental law, including those to which I now turn.
1. Implementing
Attention

Agreements

Requires

More

Effort

and

Implementing international environmental agreements or
non-binding "soft law''-taking steps necessary to make documents effective at the national level71-is an increasingly complicated proposition as legal texts become more detailed and
prescriptive.72 International environmental agreements are
rarely self-executing. An agreement or "soft law'' document can
require nations to adopt implementing legislation or regulations;73 the Kyoto Protocol, for example, would force the United
States to develop energy conservation strategies and other emissions-reducing measures.74 Other necessary implementation
steps could include such measures as the designation of an
appropriate liaison to international bodies.75 It has becmne
quite clear that nations do not automatically take all of these
steps. For example, the Basel Convention on controlling international traffic in hazardous waste was never ratified in the

70. Sands, supra note 14, at xv.
71. Professor Sands defines implementation as, "(w]hat formal or informal steps
must a State or international institution take to implement its international legal
obligations." Philippe Sands, Enforcing Environmental Security, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 50, 52 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994); see infra Part III.C.l.a. (discussing
Professor Brown Weiss'.s analysis of "implementation" as differentiated from "compliance").
72. An excellent case study of the challenges inherent in implementing complex
agreements is Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement: A Commentary, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 375 (1989).
73. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1562; Sands, supra note 71, at 53.
74. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 18, at art. 2.
75. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 71, at 53.
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United States because it would have required Congress to pass
changes to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 76
Professor Boer has focused much of his contemporary work
on the implementation of sustainable development principles
(emanating from Agenda 21 and documents preceding it) in the
Asian region. He co-authored a recent book, International Environmental Law in the Asia Pacific, 77 that collects numerous
case studies on implementing international environmental law
in the region, some of which he shared with the seminar course
students and the law school community. With his indefatigable
spirit, years of expertise and comprehensive knowledge of the
problems facing individual countries in the Asian region, such
as India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, China, and
island nations of the Pacific, he has been a leader in calling for
innovative national environmental laws and regional cooperation frameworks to promote sustainable development. 78
2. There Is an Increased Focus on Compliance
It is one thing to marshal the political will to negotiate an
international environmental agreement, still another to implement it, and yet another altogether to secure compliance with
its provisions. Paradoxically, while recent agreements incorporate a wide variety of mechanisms designed to secure compliance,79 little is actually known about whether they succeed. As
Professor Brown Weiss observes, compliance ''has long been
neglected as an important issue in international law"; the "conventional wisdom" about compliance is that nations comply with
international agreements because it is in their self-interest to
76. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 763; Mark Bradford, Note, The United States,
China & the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
And Their Disposal, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 305 (1997). For a contemporary discussion of the implementation of the Basel Convention elsewhere, see Philippe Sands,
Book Review and Note, 91 AM. J. lNT'L L. 572 (1997) (reviewing KATHARINA KUMMER,
INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF HAzARDous wASTES: THE BASEL CONVENTION AND
RELATED LEGAL RULES (1995)).
77. See BEN BOER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON!'.IBNTAL LAW IN THE AsIA PACIFIC (1998).
78. See generally Boer, supra note 26.
79. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 30; Brown Weiss, supra note
22; cf. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 763 (noting that international environmental agreements embody innovative compliance mechanisms).
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do so. 80 Now, however, that fiction is crumbling and compliance issues are attracting increased attention from commentators, many of whom follow Professor Brown Weiss's lead.81
Professor Brown Weiss's empirical study of eight nations and
five environmental agreements, a team effort with political
scientist Dr. Harold Jacobson and a group of researchers operating in nations around the world, is a landmark effort addressing compliance issues. It examines how and why it is that international environmental agreements secure compliance with
their provisions. 82 Not surprisingly, this study has garnered
substantial praise for its broad scope and creation of a valuable
knowledge base on compliance issues. According to one admirer,
the Brown Weiss-Jacobson study on compliance has the extremely useful function of moving the debate over compliance
from "ivory tower description" to a comprehensive and wideranging discussion of the ways in which actual agreements succeed.83 As a further movement in this direction, Professor
80. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1556, 1559. Besides the assumption that
nations comply, Professor Brown Weiss lists other reasons why scant attention has
been paid to compliance:
In international environmental law, this occurs in part because political
capital comes from negotiating new agreements, not from complying with
those agreements already negotiated. This also occurs for other reasons:
it is often hard to measure compliance; effectiveness of the agreement
does not necessarily correlate with compliance of the agreement; and
resources to promote compliance have often been minimal.
Id. at 1556 (footnotes omitted). For additional discussion by Professor Brown Weiss of
this and other issues related to compliance, see Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening
National Compliance with International Environmental Agreements, 27 ENVTL. POL'y
& L. 297 (1997) [hereinafter Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance].
81. The 1997 annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL)
and a recent symposium sponsored by the Michigan Journal of International Law
focused on compliance issues, "a topic that has seized the attention of researchers
within international law." Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L.
303, 303 (1998). Both meetings reflected the considerable influence of Professor Brown
Weiss's work on compliance: for example, the title of the Michigan symposium incorporated her "implementation, compliance and effectiveness" framework for evaluating
compliance. See id. at 303; see also infra notes 201-07 and accompanying text. Other
scholars have been quick to adapt Professor Brown Weiss's definitions of relevant
terms. See, e.g., Jo Elizabeth Butler, The Establishment of a Dispute Resolution/NonCompliance Mechanism in the Climate Change Convention, in Maria Gavouneli, Compliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence, 91 AM.
Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 234, 252 (1997) (referring to Professor Brown Weiss's definition
of "implementation").
82. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 30.
83. See Alvarez, supra note 81, at 305.
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Brown Weiss's Allen Chair article uses the study results to pick
apart conventional wisdom about compliance by undercutting
thirteen familiar assumptions, all of which, she avers, "turn out
either to be myths or to apply only in certain carefully prescribed conditions."84
As international environmental law matures, the compliance
discussion led by Professor Brown Weiss and Dr. Jacobson
serves another valuable purpose. It calls into question the Realist School's doubts "whether international . . . law can be even
considered 'law' without a unified supranational government, or
should merely be considered 'evanescent moments of international cooperation.'"85 Some would still argue that international
environmental law amounts to little in the absence of a central
sovereign. 86 To Professor Brown Weiss, this view is grounded
in a traditional view of the structure of the international law
system, one that, as she demonstrates in her article, is changing rapidly:
The myths [about compliance] are set in an international
legal system that is in a process of transition from a statecentered, hierarchical and static structure to one that consists of networks of actors and is non-hierarchical and dynamic. Moreover, the framework for compliance has changed
from one that is hierarchical and "top down" to one that
involves dynamic interactions between states and non-state
actors and international and domestic constituencies across
state lines. 87

In this emerging international law system, it is simply not the
case that "states do not comply at all with their international
obligations;"88 the reality is much more complicated. Thus, ac-

84. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1560.
85. Kyle Danish, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory
Agreements, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 789, 804 (1997) (book review); see also Harold H. Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2608-17 (1997) (dis·
cussing whether international law is truly "law"); supra note 61 (discussing the Real·
ist School position).
86. See, e.g., Alberto Szekely, Compliance With Environmental Treaties: The Em·
pirical Evidence, A Commentary on the Softening of International Environmental Law,
in Compliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence,
supra note 81, at 234.
87. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1557.
88. Id. at 1561.
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cording to one admirer, by debunking the conventional wisdom
about compliance Professor Brown Weiss also advances the
debate about international environmental law "beyond wellworn debates about whether international law is truly 'law' to
. . . 'post-ontological' inquiries appropriate to the new maturity
of the international system."89
3. The Status of National Sovereignty Remains in Flux
International environmental law is creating more constraints,
not fewer, on nations' abilities to act independently. 90 Detailed
international agreements embodying specific obligations necessarily encroach on national sovereignty. The dynamism in this
relationship can be seen by examining the increasing importance of international tribunals in environmental cases, which
necessarily invites a discussion of the relationship between
international and national courts. Professor Sands's article assesses the future of international environmental litigation. 91 In
it, he describes the "embryonic framework" for litigating these
cases, which includes a variety of tribunals. Professor Sands
discusses recent activity of the European Court of Justice and
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at length. The ICJ, or
"World Court" as it is popularly known, is "the principal judicial arm of the United Nations [and] a dispute settlement body
available under many environmental treaties, including the
Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions."92 Its pivotal
role in international environmental litigation stems from the
fact that treaties may give the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction over
an environmental dispute, or more typically, provide for jurisdiction upon consent of the parties. 93

89. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303.
90. See, e.g., Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 710 (noting that "[i]n many international legal instruments, states have agreed to constrain 'operational sovereignty'
while continuing to retain formal national sovereignty"); Sands, supra note 14, at xviixviii.
91. See generally Sands, supra note 31. Professor Sands has written extensively
elsewhere about international environmental litigation, including cases decided before
the !CJ and other international tribunals (particularly those in Europe). See, e.g.,
Sands, supra note 71, at 57-59 (discussing the role of judicial settlement of international environmental disputes).
92. Sands, supra note 71, at 57.
93. See id. at 57-58.
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Professor Sands has distinguished himself both as an academic and an actively practicing barrister. His observations
stem directly from his experience, most notably as a co-counsel
in several of the most recent ICJ cases to take up environmental matters. Recently, he served as a counsel for Hungary in
the important case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project, a dispute about the construction of dams on the Danube
River between Hungary and Slovakia.94 His detailed critique of
the ICJ's handling of environmental disputes therefore merits
careful attention, both for its assessment of the future of international environmental litigation and for its implications for
national sovereignty. 95
4. Public Participation in International Environmental
Lawmaking and Enforcement Is More Significant
The explosive rise of NGO participation in international environmental decision making has been called a "fundamental
shift" in international law, perhaps equal in scope to the earlier
rapid expansion of public participation in the United States. 96
As one commentator states, "the rhetoric of inclusion [at the
international level] is not mere rhetoric": international players
are emulating steps taken decades ago to guarantee public

94. Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 25); reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998); see also Hungary
and Slovakia Told To Resolve Dam Tiff, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at A12; Justice
For All From A Global Courtroom, LAWYER, Mar. 19, 1996, at 9 (describing the World
Court's recent activities and Professor Sands' involvement in the Gabcik.ovoN agymaros case).
For earlier discussions of this complicated case, see generally Gabriel Epstein,
Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and
the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 67 (1995); Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Dispute and International Freshwater Law, 14 BERK. J. INT'L L. 290 (1996); Paul R.
Williams, International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute Between
Slovakia and Hungary Concerning Construction of the Gabcikovo and Nagymaros
Dams, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
95. In Part II, I will invite the reader to consider the implications for a related
issue: domestic environmental lawmaking in a time of active debate over environmental federalism.
96. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 539 ("As in the twentieth century American
experience, the expansion of the substantive domain of environmental regulation has
been accompanied by an expanded procedural and participatory regime.").
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input in the American system. 97 It was therefore appropriate
for the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series to assess
the status of this "participatory revolution." 98
An excellent example of the rise of public participation in
international environmental law is the system of public input
established under the environmental side agreement to NAFTA,
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC), 99 which "goes further than most multilateral treaties
in terms of NGO access and participation."100 Professor
Bugeda is an authority on this Citizen's Submission process,
having played a central role (as chief of the Mexican Liaison
Office of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation's
(CEC)) in developing the factual record101 for the Cozumel
Submission-the lone submission to date to proceed to this
stage of the process. Her analysis of the Cozumel Factual Record is an instructive case study. Professor Bugeda concludes
that the Citizen's Submission process, despite its inherent
shortcomings, is an "interesting and innovative procedure" that
empowers ordinary citizens to take part in international environmental decision making. 102 As she demonstrates, it can al97. Id. at 581-82.
98. See id. at 583.
99. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
100. Raustiala, supra note 14, at 549.
101. See Final Factual Record of the Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel,
Quintana Roo, Secretariat of the CEC, Factual Record No. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Cozumel Factual Record].
102. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1614. There is a rapidly expanding body of literature on this subject. See, e.g., Greg Block, Independent Review of the North American
Agreement For Environmental Cooperation, SB79 ALI-ABA 291 (1998) (analyzing the
NAAEC's performance and, inter alia, the initial stages of the Cozumel dispute); Joseph F. DiMento and Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth:
The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 651 (1998); Noemi Gal-Or, Multilateral Trade and Supranational Environmental
Protection: The Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?, 9 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (1996); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons
from the Early Experiences, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997); James E.R. Lord, Article
14(2) of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: How High Is
The Hurdle?, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 43 (1997) (discussing the Cozumel Citizen
Submission and the requirement that submitters exhaust local remedies); David G.
Schiller, Great Expectations: The North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation Review of the Cozumel Pier Submission, 28 U. MJAf.n INTER-AM. L. REV. 437
(1997) (discussing initial stages of the Cozumel Pier Terminal dispute); Scott A.
Keefer, Comment, Citizen Petitions Under the North American Agreement on Environ-
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so spur increased domestic public participation directly by empowering ordinary citizens to accuse countries of failing to enforce their environmental laws, and indirectly by generating
information to "publicly denounce those governments when such
enforcement does not occur."103
II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INFORMS DOMESTIC LAW

From this brief description of the work of Professors Boer,
Brown Weiss, Bugeda, and Sands, the reader should be prompted to read their articles on the maturing regime of international environmental law. These articles confirm the need to move
past stale debates about whether international environmental
law is law at all to second-generation inquiries about its future.
However, the Allen Chair Symposium and seminar series afforded an opportunity to do more than demonstrate that environmental law is beyond doubt a global enterprise. 104 Professor Boer challenged the audience at his public lecture to view
domestic and international environmental law as increasingly
interrelated. In this Part, I accept that challenge and delve
more deeply into the relationship between international and
domestic environmental law. At first, one might think the differences between the two legal regimes are so great that one
could not possibly inform the other. That view, however, would
be mistaken; for a number of reasons, it is no longer an "idle
question" to evaluate international environmental law's impact
on domestic law. 105

mental Cooperation, 5 TuLsA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 211 (1997).
103. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1614.
104. The rapid expansion and development of this body of law and its growing
domestic impact make environmental law an excellent example of the internationalization of law practice and the concomitant need for globalization of the law school curriculum. See Nicholas A. Robinson, International Environmental Law, SC56 ALI-ABA
185 (Feb. 11, 1998) (noting an "emerging practice paradigm" that, "[o]ver the next 35
years, the global and transnational aspects of practicing law, and especially environmental law, will (1) alter how U.S. lawyers practice environmental law in their
'domestic' practices, and (2) come to embrace an international law content").
105. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 760.

1999]

FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO

1459

A. "Sustainable Development" Is a Conceptual Foundation for
Domestic Innovation
Probably the most obvious way in which international
environmental law influences domestic law is that it has established first principles that serve as conceptual foundations for
domestic innovation. Professor Boer observes that three separate phenomena are taking place as international environmental law matures: "globalization, internationalization, and
regionalization. "106 As part of internationalization, "countries
are looking externally to environmental conventions and
agreements to guide their own policies and laws."107 In the
United States, this is a remarkable turn of events. I began this
article by proposing that many domestic environmental lawyers
have something of a nation-centered perspective. We still tend
to think our task is to translate American ideals to the rest of
the world. 108 Today, international environmental law turns
that logic on its head. It can and does serve as a direct stimulus for the enactment of domestic laws. The United States is
often obliged by an international environmental agreement to
promulgate laws to implement the agreement or come into
compliance with its norms. 109 Besides binding obligations, in-

106. Boer, supra note 26, at 1508.
107. Id. at 1509.
108. Of course, we have been remarkably successful at this. See, e.g., Tarlock,
supra note 13, at 759 ("United States environmental law has served as the international standard for the emerging regime of international environmental law."). Professor Sands describes American influence as follows:
[T]he United States has, historically, played a dominant role in the development of international environmental law. Many of the principles
endorsed by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development were
first expressed in U.S. domestic legislation, especially the emerging rules
of international law concerning environmental impact assessment, the
right of citizens to have access to environmental information and rights
of redress before judicial and administrative bodies, and provisions on
liability for environmental damage. Many of these emerging international
commitments can be traced directly to domestic U.S. law, which has in
this and other ways contributed significantly to international law reform.
Philippe Sands, The "Greening" Of International Law: Emerging Principles And Rules,
1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 293 (1994).
109. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text; see also Tarlock, supra note
13, at 761-62 (citing the example of the Endangered Species Act, "initially enacted to
~plement the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species").
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ternational environmental law has yielded important principles
that can be touchstones for domestic innovation. 110
Perhaps the most notable example of such a principle is the
one I focus on in this section: the emergence of "sustainable
development"-a principle first articulated on the world
stage-as a new framework for integrating economic development and environmental concerns in domestic legal systems.
1. The Development of "Sustainable Development"

Sustainable development has become widely accepted as a
framework for advancing developmental and environmental
goals both at the domestic and international level. m Sustainable development means much more than maintaining a stock
of resources over time. 112 Sustainable development principles
can revolutionize environmental law113 by addressing issues of

110. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 762 (noting that international environmental
law can provide the "conceptual foundation" for domestic law); see also Nicholas A.
Robinson, Attaining Systems for Sustainability Through Environmental Law, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 86, 87 (1997) ("Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),
such as the Montreal Protocol and other agreements under the Vienna Convention on
the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer or the Convention on Biological Diversity, provide common 'rules of the road' for national legislatures shaping their
environmental laws."). Professor Tarlock argues that the authority of the Foreign
Commerce Clause could be invoked to use these principles to justify stronger domestic
environmental laws. See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 761-62.
111. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1510-12; see also Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52.
112. See Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52 (noting that "the concept of sustainability
comes from earlier ecological studies of predator-prey relationships and was adopted
by economists to refer to the maintenance of capital stocks over a limited time horizon."); see also PHILIP SHABECOFF, A NEW NAME FOR PEACE 198 (1996) (noting that
"sustainability of resources, after all, was the central intellectual premise underlying
conservationism" and describing efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to draw attention to
depletion of resources); Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from
Federal Regulation of Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. AND CONTEMP.
L. 1, 3-4 (1995). Problems related to resource depletion, overconsumption of resources,
and pollution are obviously integral to discussions of sustainable development. See
generally Boer, supra note 41, at 316-17 (quoting JEREMY CAREW-REID ET AL.,
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR THEm
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 17 (1994)). For that reason, writers occasionally continue to refer to sustainability in the language of steady state maintenance of resources. See, e.g., JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 246
(1993) (contrasting "a sustainable economy" with an "exhaustive economy").
113. See Ruhl, supra note 11, at 992-95 (proposing sustainable development as a
policy principle for a "revolutionized environmental law").
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pollution and resource depletion while simultaneously incorporating economic concerns and equity arguments first raised by
developing nations. 114
Sustainable development's modern history dates to the 1980
publication of the World Conservation Strategy; 115 its "decisive
breakthrough"116 on the world stage was the publication of the
Brundtland Report (better known as Our Common Future). 117
That report had a potent message: environmental issues, economic concerns, and developmental inequities must be addressed together. 118 Our Common Future provides the most
commonly cited definition of sustainable development: 119

114. See SHABECOFF, supra note 112, at 198-99; Dernbach, supra note 11, at 16;
Eisen, supra note 112, at 3 (noting the potential for sustainable development to "address equity concerns, such as achieving a just distribution of resources between developed and developing nations"); Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52-53 (noting that
sustainable development has been adopted as the standard of modern
international environmental law in an effort to bridge the North-South or
rich-poor environmental gap ... [and that] the major challenge posed by
the theory of sustainable development has been to systematically and
permanently incorporate the full environmental consequences of resource
use into the modern economic concepts that help to structure the politics
of resource allocation).
115. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES ET AL., WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1980); see also Boer, supra note 41, at 308 (noting
that the publication of the World Conservation Strategy spurred governments to establish national conservation strategies); Dernbach, supra note 11, at 15 n. 71, (noting
that the 1987 OUR COMMON FuTURE report builds upon the WORLD CONSERVATION
STRATEGY).
116. See SHABECOFF, supra note 112, at 198.
117. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR Co:MMON FuTURE (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FuTURE]; see also Boer, supra note 41, at 310;
Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 83, 83
(1997) (stating that "[sustainable development] is an idea made prominent by the
World Commission on Environment and Development"); SHABECOFF, supra note 112,
at 198-99 (describing the development of OUR COMMON FuTURE).
118. See OUR COMMON FuTURE, supra note 116, at 5 (stating that "ecology and
economy are becoming ever more interwoven-locally, regionally, and globally-into a
seamless net of cause and effect"); see also Lash, supra note 117, at 83; Tarlock,
supra note 14, at 52 ("The Brundtland Commission succeeded in collapsing the dichotomy between environmental protection and development to induce the developing
world to accept the legitimacy of environmental protection.").
119. See BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 13; see also Dernbach, supra note 11, at
17-18; Lash, supra note 117, at 84 (noting that the President's Commission on Sustainable Development adopted the Our Common Future definition); Tarlock, supra
note 14, at 52 (terming the Our Common Future definition the "current working definition of sustainable development").
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Sustainable development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs. It contains
within it two key concepts:
(1) The concept of "needs," in particular the essential needs
of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be
given; and
(2) The idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to
meet present and future needs. 120

As Professor Boer has noted, "there has been a good deal of
debate over the definition of sustainable development and over
what principles might be identified as assisting in its achievement. "121 But "[n]otwithstanding the debate over what the
principles of sustainable development are," the international
community has acted to endorse the concept and flesh out its
specifics. 122 The Rio Conference "introduce[d] the mandate of
sustainable development as the basis for global, national, and
local action," 123 with twenty-seven principles designed to advance sustainable development. The UNCED delegates
unanimously adopted a second document, Agenda 21, that, as
Professor Boer has noted, "provides policies, plans, programmes,
and guidelines for national governments to implement the Rio
Declaration principles."124
120. OUR COMMON FuTuRE, supra note 117, at 87; see also BOER ET AL., supra
note 77, at 13.
121. BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 13. Professor Boer has criticized the OUR
COMMON FuTuRE definition "because it invites narrow interpretations such as 'sustainable economic development,' without explicitly requiring concern for or focus on the
continued viability of ecosystems." Boer, supra note 41, at 317 (emphasis in original).
122. BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 13.
123. Boer, supra note 41, at 313; see also Dernbach, Sustainable Development,
supra note 11, at 18 (noting that at Rio "for the first time, the international community endorsed sustainable development."); Tarlock, Latin American Rainforest Management, supra note 14, at 52 (noting that "Rio indicated the formal success of the
Brundtland Commission, thus making sustainable development the organizing principle for all future international efforts") (emphasis in original).
124. Boer, supra note 41, at 314; Dernbach, supra note 11, at 18-19, 27 (noting
that Agenda 21's principles are the basis for an "ambitious intergenerational social,
economic, and environmental compact."); see also Tarlock, supra note 14, at 52 n.86.
Professor Boer notes that Agenda 21, "should be read together with the Rio
Declaration." Boer, supra note 41, at 314 n.60. See generally Dernbach, supra note 11
(discussing implementation of sustainable development principles in the United
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Agenda 2l's comprehensiveness makes it the blueprint for
action on sustainable development at the national and international level. 125 Its forty chapters provide an encyclopedic pattern of goals and objectives for sustainable development, 126
and specific actions that nations should take to achieve those
goals and objectives.127 As "soft law,'' it is every country's responsibility to incorporate Agenda 21 into its domestic decision
making and to create national policies based on Agenda 2l's
mandates. 128 If the IUCN Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development129 is adopted as an international
treaty, it could elevate principles of sustainable development to
an international requirement. 130 Sustainable development will
then have completed its transition from an aspirational princiStates); see infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of Agenda 21's implementation domestically and internationally.
125. See Dernbach, supra note 11, at 19.
126. See id.; John Dernbach, U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A
Five-Year Review, [1997] 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,504 (containing a thorough discussion of Agenda 21). See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Virtual Borders?
Some Legal-Geo-Philosophical Musings on Three Globally Significant Fragile Ecosystems Under United Nations' Agenda 21, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23, 24 (1997) (stating
that "Agenda 21 was intended by its drafters to be 'a comprehensive action plan on
sustainable development to guide the policies of governments for the remainder of
this century and into the next."); Lash, supra note 117, at 84.
127. Professor John Dernbach's recent article outlining the many steps the United
States would be required to take to use sustainable development as a framework for
decision making at all levels of government illustrates that sustainable development
has advanced well beyond the aspirational definition of the OUR COMMON FUTuRE
report. See generally Dernbach, supra note 11.
128.
To some extent we recognize a limited normative force of certain
norms even though we concede that those norms would not be enforceable by an international court or other international organ. . . . To say
that it [soft law] does not exist because it is not of the "enforceable"
variety that most legal norms exhibit might blind us to another dimension of the reality of international practice.
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 55 (Anthony D'Amato and Kirsten
Engel eds., 1996).
129. WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1995) [hereinafter IUCN DRAFT COVENANT].
130. See BOER ET AL., supra note 77, at 15-17 (discussing the draft covenant); see
also Nicholas A. Robinson, IUCNs Proposed Covenant on Environment and Develop·
ment, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 133 (1995) (describing the origin of the draft covenant). The covenant has no legal effect at present, but Professor Boer notes that it
may be submitted to the United Nations for adoption as a treaty. See BOER ET AL.,
supra note 77, at 16. Article 1 of the draft covenant states that its objective is "to
establish integrated obligations to achieve the environmental conservation and sustainable development necessary for humans to enjoy a healthy and productive life
within nature." IUCN DRAFT COVENANT, supra note 129, art. 1.
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ple to a set of requirements imposed on every nation to guide
development and implementation of environmental laws.
2. Implementing Sustainable Development Principles in the
Asian Region and in the United States
If one were to take Agenda 21 seriously, it would require a
fundamental reordering of societal institutions; Professor Boer
cites provisions calling for development and implementation of
comprehensive ''legal and regulatory framework[s] for environmental management" and recognizes that "substantial barriers
of an economic, political, and sometimes cultural character" can
hamper progress toward this goal. 131 Not surprisingly, as Professor Nicholas Robinson has observed, "in many nations [sustainable development is] still undefined operationally."132 Sustainable development cannot be implemented simply by allocating funding for a single government program or establishing a
blue ribbon panel. Professor Boer has noted that "[t]he achievement of sustainability is a complex task, involving a broad
range of governmental, community, and industry initiatives.
These initiatives must be implemented globally, regionally,
nationally, locally, and individually."133

Professor Boer's article is a comprehensive compendium of
case studies examining how sustainable development principles
articulated on the international level have served as the impetus for laws and regulations in individual nations and sub-re-

131. Boer, supra note 26, at 1507; see also Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,506
(stating that one cannot just "take Agenda 21 off the shelf and implement it"). This
sort of fundamental change is exactly what Professor Dernbach recommends in his
most recent article on sustainable development. He argues that this type of change
"may represent the only realistic means of achieving sustainable development":
At day's end, the core responsibility of developed countries is to recreate
workable models of sustainable development within their own boundaries
that are not merely functional, but that are obviously more attractive
than the development approach that they are currently pursuing. Indeed
it can be argued that the most important way for developed countries to
exercise international leadership is through their domestic implementation
and use of such models.
Dernbach, supra note 11, at 45; cf. Robinson, supra note 110, at 87 (noting that
"[sustainable development] is a goal with many obstacles blocking its realization").
132. Robinson, supra note 110, at 87.
133. Boer, supra note 41, at 325.

1999]

FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO

1465

gions of the Asian region. Professor Boer observes that countries in the Asia-Pacific region have only begun to incorporate
strategies for sustainability into their environmental laws and
regulatory structures. 134 The extent to which individual countries in the Asian region have developed and implemented environmental laws varies widely, as Professor Boer notes in his
case studies. India has comprehensive environmental laws but
implementation has been "weak." Nepal's environmental law, by
contrast, is barely two years old. Countries in the Mekong river
region "are at different stages of legislative sophistication concerning the protection of the environment."135 China (whose
formidable environmental problems Professor Boer discusses at
length) has adopted its own Agenda 21 and has formed a ''National Environment Protection Agency" but is only "slowly" addressing its "serious environmental challenges."136
Professor Boer's extensive discussion of environmental laws
and regulatory frameworks in the Asian region provides a
wealth of insights about the obstacles standing in the path of
successful implementation of sustainable development principles
in specific situations. These obstacles include imprecise definition of programs "necessary to achieve a coherent approach"
to environmental protection;137 insufficient financial resources
and technical expertise;138 inadequate administrative, political,
and legal structures to bring about change;139 recalcitrant government bureaucrats unwilling to make tough choices;140 and

134. See generally Boer, supra note 26.
135. Id. at 1522.
136. Id. at 1539.
137. Id. at 1523 (discussing the Mekong River Basin Agreement and finding that it
"lacks sufficient detail").
138. See id. at 1527, 1549 (discussing "financial impediments" to achieving the
goals of the ASEAN Strategic Plan of Action and noting that the South Asian countries "could clearly use a great deal of assistance" and that there is a "need for further technical assistance and resources" in the South Pacific island nations).
Similarly, Professor Sands has observed that "increased technical, financial, and
other assistance to States, particularly to developing States, is necessary to encourage
domestic implementation." See Sands, supra note 14, at xlvii.
139. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1527, 1544 (discussing the ASEAN Strategic Plan
of Action and political obstacles to change in China generally); cf. Robinson, supra
note 110, at 87.
140. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1533 (discussing environmental protection in Indonesia); cf. Robinson, Attaining Systems For Sustainability, supra note 110, at 87 (noting that environmental progress can be thwarted because "most nations have left in
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deficient political will on the part of nations to cooperate with
each other. 141 He suggests greater regional cooperation to address important environmental problems based on the possible
model of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme.142 That, he says, would "promote a more consistent
approach to environmental management and conservation of
natural resources in the region."143
Environmental law in the United States is obviously more
well developed than that of the Asian region but still lags behind in terms of achieving sustainable development. Commentators have called for the United States to have a "more consistent approach" to environmental law based on sustainable development principles, noting that the "concerted effort to progressively integrate governmental decision making on environmental, social, and economic issues"144 that Agenda 21 requires is lacking. Professor John Dernbach, who has studied
American efforts to implement Agenda 21, concludes it ''has had
little discernible effect on U.S. law and policy."145 The rather
modest implementation efforts include the establishment of a
President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), whose
reports, 146 filled with platitudes and recommendations overflowing with motherhood-and-apple-pie appeal, 147 have been
largely ignored. 148

place the agencies and jurisdictions that preside over the old policies" and "these
institutional players are . . . wedded to 'business as usual'").
141. See Boer, supra note 26, at 1527-28 (quoting Sinlon S.C. Tay, South East
Asian Forest Fires: Haze over ASEAN and International Environmental Law, 7 REV.
EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 202, 204 (1998)).
142. See id. at 1547-50.
143. Id. at 1550.
144. Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,507.
145. Id. See generally Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The

Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5
DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 175 (1996) (reaching sinrilar conclusions).
146. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING ON CONSENSUS (1997); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMEIUCA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPEIUTY, OPPORTUNITY AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
FOR THE FuTURE (1996) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE AMERICA].
147. One PCSD goal for sustainable development is to "[e]nsure that every person
enjoys the benefits of clean air, clean water, and a healthy environment at home, at
work, and at play." SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 146, at ch. 1. Who wouldn't be
opposed to that?
148. See Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,508; J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Rel-
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The PCSD reports and other federal efforts hardly amount to
a comprehensive plan to implement Agenda 21's recommendations and proposals. In a revealing recent essay, Professor J.B.
Ruhl describes "seven degrees of relevance" in translating policy
ideas into law, from the first degree where "the idea becomes
widely expressed through a generally-accepted norm statement,"
to the seventh degree where the norm becomes fully embodied
in hard law. 149 He finds that the PCSD's reports were an
"opening salvo" in the evolution of American sustainable development policy.150 He observes that "Sustainable America is a
long way from hard law to apply" but believes that the PCSD
"advances rather than stalls or reverses the evolution of [U.S.]
sustainable development policy."151 This puts sustainable development at the fifth degree of relevance-it is not translated
into law, but is nevertheless part of the everyday parlance of
federal agencies. 152
Along the way to malting a more fully formed sustainable
development law, good ideas could be frustrated by uncommitted or recalcitrant bureaucrats, or by insufficient education of
the general public and a resulting lack· of interest. 153 Yet as
Professor Ruhl explains, while neither the PCSD's reports, nor
the subsequent policy discussions of sustainable development by
federal governmental agencies have been translated into law,
"the message flowing out of official channels is loud and
clear-sustainable development is a fully endorsed norm statement of environmental policy."154 How the United States will
take the remaining steps to transform this policy into law remains unclear. Given how little has been accomplished and how
much would be required, it is difficult if not impossible to pre-

evance: Why Should Real·World Environmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable
Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 273, 288 (1998) (stating that
"there has been no broad initiative thus far to create law that explicitly builds upon
the PCSD's work").
149. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 277.
150. Id. at 285.
151. Id. at 286.
152. See id. at 284.
153. See Dernbach, supra note 126, at 10,507-19 (describing the obstacles to implementing sustainable development in the United States); Ruhl, supra note 148, at 29293 (listing the "five systemic factors . . . that impede sustainable development" in the
United States and citing Professor Dernbach's analysis).
154. Ruhl, supra note 148, at 287.
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diet the future course of sustainable development law in the
United States. Professor Boer, like his American counterparts
who believe in the concept as a framework for change, is toiling
at an early stage of legal innovation. In the United States and
the Asian region, overcoming formidable obstacles-somewhat
different ones in each case, to be sure--will be necessary to
complete the successful implementation of the "first principle"
of sustainable development created on the world stage.
B. Reinvigorating Democracy-Public Participation and the
Cozumel Submission
International environmental law can do more than generate
first principles. The ascendancy of public input in the international environmental decision making system can reinvigorate
democracy domestically. Enhanced participation at the international level can mean much more than the simple expansion of
public participation opportunities available to actors and the
concomitant expansion in procedural guarantees in international
fora. 155 First, in a limited but growing number of situations,
international environmental law provides a direct mechanism of
citizen input in project decisions even where domestic law precludes it. Professor Bugeda's analysis demonstrates that an
international environmental law mechanism-such as the development of the "factual record" in the Cozumel case--can provide
a direct avenue for public input in a domestic project. In the
United States, concerned citizens could use the Citizen's Submission process to influence individual decisions, though, as I
discuss below, I believe it would be difficult to do so.
Second, the Cozumel experience demonstrates the importance
of using all relevant means to generate openness and transparency in the availability of information, especially where these
means are lacking under domestic law. Professor Bugeda reminds us that although the Citizen's Submission process is
limited because it can proceed no further than the development
of a factual record, it has provided a springboard for Mexican
155. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 539-40 (noting that "international regulation
increasingly influences and shapes domestic policy, [and] the procedures of international and national policymaking have converged," citing public participation as an
example).
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environmental groups to discuss the project's merits in public
fora (which they would previously have been unable to do).
Thus, the final lesson of Professor Bugeda's article is just as
significant: that we need both formal mechanisms for public
participation and the ability and resources to create meaningful
public input through other means when formal mechanisms are
insufficiently available or exercised.
I begin this section by placing the Cozumel Submission in
the context of the rise of public participation in international
environmental decision making.
1. Increased Public Participation in International Environmental Decision Making

While international environmental law allows for some public
input, this was not always the case. Until very recently, NGOs
played a limited role in the development and enforcement of
international environmental law. NGO involvement in international law in the period before 1972 has been characterized
with the label of "[u]nderachievement."156 NGO involvement in
international environmental law was no different. With very
few exceptions, environmental treaties neither mentioned public
participation nor provided explicitly for any public involvement.157
Since then, NGO influence in international environmental
decision making has been on the rise. 158 The Brundtland Re156. See Charnovitz, supra note 64, at 190. It bears noting, however, that NGOs
have not always been uninvolved in international law, as some have claimed.
Charnovitz describes a cyclical pattern in which NGO influence has risen or fallen
periodically throughout the past two centuries.
157. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 545. Before the recent expansion in NGO
participation in environmental decision malcing in the 1980s and 1990s, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) contained perhaps the
most significant mechanism for NGO participation. See Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature March 3,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [herreinafter CITES]; Raustiala, supra note
14, at 569 (calling the "inclusive participatory rules" of CITES an "anomaly" in international environmental law of the time); id. at 549 (stating that "CITES stands out
as the first major multi-lateral treaty to incorporate NGOs in an active way, and is
clearly a landmark in this regard"); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 983 (1998) (calling NGO participation "integral to the operation of CITES").
158. See Charnovitz, supra note 64; Raustiala, supra note 14; see also Brown
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port was the first international report to advocate expanded
public participation opportunities. 159 Building upon that foundation, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration call for broad public
participation in developing and enforcing laws, and for increased public access to information necessary to facilitate this
involvement. 160 The Rio Declaration states that "environmental
issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level."161 Agenda 21 advocates broadbased public participation in environmental decision making as
a "fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of sustainable
development." 162
Reflecting this enhanced emphasis on citizen participation,
the trend is toward increased participation in international
environmental decision malting. NGOs have "assumed an increasingly important role in the negotiation, ratification, implementation, and enforcement of international environmental
agreements."163 NGOs have increasingly taken part in official
negotiations and have attempted to influence developments
through informal pressure and other techniques. 164 Professor
Bugeda notes that the unique feature of the NAAEC in terms
of public participation is that any citizen or environmental
group may become directly involved in enforcement by making
a submission to the Secretariat of the CEC, the body which
administers the NAAEC, asserting that a party to the agreement is "failing to effectively enforce its environmental

Weiss, supra note 36, at 693-94 (describing the myriad of ways in which NGOs are
involved both formally and informally in developing international environmental law).
159. See OUR COMMON F'uTURE, supra note 117; see also Raustiala, supra note 14,
at 565-66.
160. See, e.g., Boer, supra note 41, at 332 (noting that "both Agenda 21 and the
Rio Declaration recognise the vital importance of public participation to the achievement of environmental goals"); Dernbach, Sustainable Deuelopment, supra note 11, at
40.
161. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, at princ. 10; see also Boer, supra note 41, at
332; Raustiala, supra note 14, at 566.
162. Agenda 21, supra note 59, at para. 23.2; see also Dernbach, supra note 11, at
37 n.198.
163. Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 693.
164. See id. at 693-94.
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laws." 165 This, of course, is exactly what took place in the
Cozumel pier terminal dispute.
2. The Cozumel Experience and Domestic Public Participation
a. The Cozumel Submission
The Citizen's Submission process, as noted above, empowers
ordinary citizens or environmental groups to make submissions
to the CEC asserting that a party to the NAAEC is "failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws."166 The process had
previously been used by a handful of submitters; the Cozumel
Submission was the first to reach the stage of a factual record.167
By stark contrast to the normal American ideal, public participation was lacking in the evaluation of the Cozumel port terminal. Mexican environmentalists had little opportunity to have
their voices heard in any environmental impact analysis of the
terminal project under the ''NEPA-like" provisions of Mexico's
General Law for Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection (LGEE). 168 As Professor Bugeda explains, and as
reflected in the Cozumel Factual Record, this was especially
egregious because the proposed construction project was a major
undertaking:

165. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1598 (footnote omitted); see NAAEC, supra note 99,
at art. 14; David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early
Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163 (1997) (detailing descriptions of the Citizen's Submission process); see generally Commission For Environmental Cooperation (visited
May 13, 1998) <http:www.cec.org> (describing the CEC's activities and the citizen
submissions lodged to date).
166. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1598 (footnote omitted); see supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
167. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1594.
168. LEY GENERAL DEL EQUILIBRIO ECOL6GICO Y DE PROTECCfON AL AMBIENTE
[L.G.E.E.] (1996) (Mex.), available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Mxenv File (General
Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection). The LGEE provisions
under Article 28 are discussed in Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 100, at 4. See
also Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1606-07. See generally Heather N. Stevenson, Environmental Impact Assessment Laws in the Nineties: Can the United States and Mexico
Learn From Each Other?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1675 (1999) (discussing Mexican environmental impact assessment law, comparing it to NEPA, and finding that NEPA
provides for more extensive public input).
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According to the Submitters, the "Cruise Ship Pier Project
in Cozumel, Quintana Roo" forms an "indivisible part" of a
larger-scale project, which the Submitters refer to as the
"Port Terminal Project," comprising, in addition to the Pier,
a passenger terminal building, a means of access from the
terminal to the cruise ship pier, a parking lot, and a public
access road leading to the Chan-Kanaab Highway. 169

The citizen submitters argued that construction of the pier was
authorized without proper evaluation of the entire project, as
required under Article 28 of the LGEE. 170 Information needed
to validate this claim was difficult, if not impossible, for Mexican environmental groups to obtain from recalcitrant bureaucrats. The Mexican authorities' stonewalling response to the
original submission confirms the lack of governmental attention
to citizen groups' concerns. 171
The publication of the factual record was the endpoint of a
lengthy process prescribed by Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAAEC. 172 The process commenced with the submission, continued through the CEC Secretariat's "acceptance" of the submission and two CEC Council votes (the first to prepare a factual record and the second to make the resulting document
public), and ended with the factual record's publication. 173 The
fifty-five page factual record was the product of a considerable
investment of CEC resources, including several years' effort on
Professor Bugeda's part. It presents a comprehensive look at
the Cozumel project; its sections include an exhaustive detailed
summary of the facts developed in the CEC's investigation174

169. Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 101, at 3.
170. See L.G.E.E., tit. I., ch. V, art. 28. This argument sounds familiar because it
is directly analogous to those made in cases in the United States where environmentalists argue that projects are improperly segmented to avoid preparation of environmental impact statements under NEPA. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.8(3), at 952-57 (2d ed. 1994).
171. See Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 101, at 7; Bugeda, supra note 29, at
1606-10.
172. See NAAEC, supra note 99.
173. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1616; see also Lopez, supra note 165, at 185
(footnotes omitted); Submissions on Enforcement Matters-Articles 14 & 15 of the
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) (visited Nov. 10,
1998) <http://www.cec.org/english/citizen/index.cfm?format=l> (description of the Citizen's Submission process available on the CEC's Web site).
174. See Cozumel Factual Record, supra note 101, at 13-40.
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and a seventeen-year chronological history of development in
the Cozumel Pier area. 175 As such, the factual record spotlights a wealth of information not previously publicly available.
Serving as the culmination of a lengthy and thorough investigation, the factual record is also a substantial professional
achievement for Professor Bugeda and her collaborators.
b. Lessons for Domestic Public Participation
Using Professor Bugeda's analysis as a reminder of the importance of broad-based domestic participation might seem
unnecessary. We generally consider public involvement in our
environmental decision making one of the "untouchables of
modern democracy."176 Extensive public participation in domestic environmental law is deeply rooted, 177 so much so that
we often assume its omnipresence. 178 Public activism led to
the enactment of modern federal environmental laws. 179 Stakeholder participation is common in the creation of new laws, 180
development of environmental regulations by administrative
agencies, 181 and even in the design of reinvention initia-

175. See id. at 45-52.
176. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REv. 173, 176 (1997).
177. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A L. REv. 981,
982 (1994); Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law: More Than Just a Passing Fad, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 797, 801-02 (1986); see also Rossi, supra note 176, at 175 (noting
that public participation enjoys a "sacrosanct status" in our society). For an interesting contemporary perspective, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Is the Environmental Movement a Critical Internet Technology?, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 323 (1997) (stating that
the "Environmental Movement pioneered mass political movements to protect the
environment" and analyzing the potential use of the Internet to further environmental
goals).
178. See Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency of Enuironmental Regulation and Public
Participation in the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1127, 1135 (1995) (stating that "we take for granted our broad access
to the courts and our ability to use the courts in order to address environmental
issues").
179. See SHABECOFF, supra note 112, at 62 (describing the history of public involvement in fashioning environmental laws).
180. See Spaulding, supra note 178, at 1136-37.
181. See Raustiala, supra note 14, at 576 ("The APA and subsequent statute-specific procedures rest squarely on the notion that 'people should have a chance to say
what kind of law they want before it is made.'" (quoting MARTIN SHAPmo, WHO
GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? 45 (1988))). Providing opportunities for public comment on
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tives. 182 There is a long tradition of citizen involvement in enforcing environmental laws in the courts. 183 In recent years,
informal stakeholder dialogues have attempted to extend public
participation beyond that provided by formal means. 184 In
short, public participation, defined as broadly as possible, is a
touchstone of modern environmental law with widely recognized
benefits.185

pending regulations and permits is, of course, "accepted practice for regulators at all
levels of government." FINAL REPORT OF THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 49 (1997) [hereinafter E4E REPORT].
Where the ordinary notice and comment procedure of citizen input in regulation
may be ineffective, the process of negotiated rulemaking (or "reg-neg") may promote
direct stakeholder involvement in regulatory development. See Siobhan Mee, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?,
25 B.C. ENVTL. A.FF. L. REV. 213 (1997) (stating that "[t]he process is a means of
achieving improved regulation through cooperation between government agencies, the
regulated community, and public interest groups"). See generally Cary Coglianese,
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46
DUKE L.J. 1255, 1271, 1330-36 (1997) (describing negotiated rulemaking and providing
an assessment of its promise of improving the rulemaking process).
182. See Steinzor, supra note 1, at 112 (noting that initiatives such as the Common Sense Initiative and Project XL "involve some form of public participation"); cf
id. at 141-43 (commenting, however, that these public participation processes are
often inadequate).
183. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805 (1986)
passim (discussing the author's involvement in the famous "snail darter" lawsuit under the Endangered Species Act).
Since the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, which added
the citizen suit provision of Clean Air Act § 304 (Clean Air Act § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. §
7604 (1994)), similar provisions have become common in federal environmental statutes. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 571 (1992)
(listing numerous citizen suit provisions of federal environmental statutes); Barry
Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizens Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833,
835-68 (1985); David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular
Federal System: Can Three Not be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by
the United States, the States and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1617-27
(1995). But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizens Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 222 (1992) (noting that "the citizen
suit is probably best understood as a band-aid superimposed on a system that can
meet with only mixed success").
184. See E4E REPORT, supra note 181, at 49.
185. These benefits include:
[E]ngaging stakeholders (1) supports democratic decision-making, (2) ensures that public values are considered, (3) develops the understanding
needed to make better decisions, (4) improves the knowledge base for
decision-making, (5) can reduce the overall time and expense involved in

1999]

FROM STOCKHOLM TO KYOTO

1475

This ideal, however, is not always met, as I have demonstrated elsewhere with respect to brownfields redevelopment projects.186 In cases where domestic law provides inadequate
means of public input, international environmental law can
provide new means of public participation, even though one
would still be hard pressed to argue that a mechanism like the
Citizen's Submission process gives NGOs and ordinary citizens
as much influence as ordinary citizens have in the United
States.187
For example, local activists in the United States could consider a submission as an alternative to domestic public participation processes. Critics of the remediation process at a
Superfund site could argue that the United States was failing
to enforce its environmental laws effectively, and request the
development of a factual record. The basis of such a submission
presumably would be that the EPA should require a more stringent standard of cleanup. 188 The factual record, as in the
Cozumel case, would serve as a basis for the investigation and
development of facts to support this contention. Leaving aside
for the moment the considerable procedural obstacles involved
in proceeding to this stage,189 the factual record's limitations

decision-making, (6) may improve the credibility of agencies responsible
for managing risks, and (7) should generate better-accepted, more readily
implemented risk-management decisions.
Id. (quoting PRESIDENTIAiiCONGRESSIONAL C01\.1MISSION ON RISK AsSESS!\IBNT AND RISK
MANAGE!\IBNT, FRAf.IBWORK FOR ENVIRONI<.IBNTAL RISK MANAGE!<.IBNT, FINAL REPORT 52
(1997)).
186. See generally Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits
of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentiues, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883.
187. For example, there is little recognition of the ability of an individual citizen
to sue to enforce international environmental agreements. See, e.g., Schiller, supra
note 102, at 448. But see Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1995) (individual plaintiff successful in case before the European Court of Human Rights on
environmental claim premised upon violations of an international human rights convention).
188. The submitters would argue that the cleanup did not meet the requirements
of the strict cleanup standard of CERCLA § 121. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
189. The submission could be doomed from the outset. The CEC Secretariat has
sole discretion to reject a submission, and the NAAEC outlines several factors to
guide the Secretariat's decision. In the seminar course, Professor Bugeda highlighted
one important factor that might cause a rejection: the Secretariat may reject a submission if it deems the submission to be designed to harass industry rather than
promote enforcement of environmental law. See NAAEC, supra note 99, art. 14(1)(a)(f), at 1488-89; see also Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1599.
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pose a problem. Professor Bugeda joins other commentators who
have criticized the process of NAAEC Articles 14 and 15 because it terminates in the preparation of a document which is
only informational and has no legal force. 190 To proceed further under the NAAEC and require a party to enforce its environmental laws, the dispute resolution process must be invoked.
Unfortunately, that process is available only to parties to the
agreement, not to ordinary citizens. 191
Professor Bugeda's article, however, does more than allow us
to observe that the Citizen's Submission process could be extended to domestic projects, however useful that might be. She
points out that the information revealed during the preparation
of the factual record enabled NGOs and Mexican lawyers to use
the media to attempt to hold governments and developers accountable for their actions. Elevating the discussion of the
Cozumel project to the international level provoked heightened
attention to the project and created added pressure on the Mexican government to comply with applicable domestic environmental laws. 192 The result, however, was hardly a desirable
outcome for Mexican environmentalists. Media attention catalyzed a "spirited debate" about the Cozumel project, 193 but in
the end, Professor Bugeda concludes that, "the procedure had
little impact on the environmental community, and none whatsoever on the tourist project in Cozumel."194
Despite this outcome, the Cozumel experience shows the
Citizen's Submission process to be "a crucial advance for the
involvement of . . . NGOs[ ] in the North American environmental dialogue. "195 The public pressure brought to bear on
the Cozumel project through this process demonstrates the

190. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1603-04; see also Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 75
(noting that "the absence of direct guarantee of remedy is perceived by some as a
serious shortcoming of the submission process"); Mary Sutter, Pull Pier Permits,
"Green" Groups Urge Mexico Ministries, J. COMM., Nov. 6, 1997, at 3B (noting that
"environmentalists complain that, with no enforcement recommendations, the [factual
record] does little to help the environment in NAFTA countries").
191. See NAAEC, supra note 99, art. 20; see also Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1594;
Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 75.
192. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1615; see also Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 91.
193. See Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1615; cf. Gal-Or, supra note 102, at 77-78.
194. Bugeda, supra note 29, at 1616.
195. Id. at 1603 (footnote omitted).
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value of openness and transparency of information. 196 The importance of making information available is highlighted adroitly
by the fact that Mexican environmental groups could not have
generated public pressure on the government and developer to
comply with environmental laws without information previously
withheld from them. In this case, even a relatively weak international process limited to preparation of an unenforceable
informational document created opportunities for ventilating
important issues. In the United States, of course, environmentalists frequently resort to public fora to monitor compliance
with environmental laws. If a community group has the benefit
of information as comprehensive as that of the Cozumel Factual
Record, it will be better able to do this in any particular case.
Reminding us of the importance of this is another important
accomplishment of Professor Bugeda's article.
C. New Ways of Thinking About Old Problems (The Example of
Compliance)

Professor Brown Weiss's article spotlights another way in
which international environmental law affects domestic law: it
can shed insight into how a domestic regulatory system should
be structured to effectuate compliance with its provisions. One
commentator notes that the potential impact of Professor Brown
Weiss's work on compliance extends beyond international environmental agreements,197 providing a theoretical basis for a
discussion of compliance in international law generally. 198 I
believe this groundbreaking study may have even wider applicability. In this section, I propose that it can inform important
issues related to compliance in the domestic setting, using the
example of brownfields laws and policies to make my point.
Because international environmental law is so new, the actors in the system are constantly trying out new approaches to

196. This is also demonstrated by Professor Brown Weiss's discussion of the utility
of reporting requirements in international environmental agreements. See infra Part
II.C.1.c.
197. See Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303.
198. See id. at 307.
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ensure compliance with the evolving legal regime. 199 Professor
Brown Weiss has described some of these as follows:
Features which are intended to encourage compliance .
include the establishment of an implementation committee
and non-compliance procedures, which have been unusually
effective for the Montreal Protocol, engagement of an enforcement officer (as in CITES), publication of violations (as
in CITES and Basel), providing a formal role for NGOs (as
in UNESCO's World Heritage Convention and in CITES)
developing a formal way with industry (as in the Montreal
Protocol and Ozone Action) and establishing scientific and
technical assessment and advice bodies to ensure that the
convention keeps pace with scientific advances. 200

The breathtaking variety of this experimentation suggests that
any means of ensuring compliance domestically will probably
have some international parallel. Finally, the iterative nature of
compliance mechanisms in international environmental law,
with contemporary agreements building upon the successes and
failures of the past, will offer lessons for approaches to implement when first choices do not work.
So when we ask whether domestic actors are in "compliance"
with a law or policy, whether the law is "effective" in meeting
societal goals, or whether states and the federal government
should rely on negative incentives such as sanctions or less
formal norms of ensuring compliance, I suggest that Professor
Brown Weiss's debunking of myths about compliance can offer
some valuable insights.
1. Demythologizing Compliance

Before proceeding to a discussion of implications for the domestic setting, I summarize some of Professor Brown Weiss's
significant observations. I caution the reader that others could
also be viewed as important to the domestic setting; for example, her comments about Myth Nine (concerning the role of
NGOs) have considerable implications for our view of the role of
public interest environmental groups in the domestic law sys-

199. See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 708.
200. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 302.
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tern. In this section, I group a number of Professor Brown
Weiss's responses to conventional wisdom about compliance into
three categories for the purpose of drawing parallels to the
domestic setting. These categories include:

- Delimiting the Analysis (Myths One and Two): Professor
Brown Weiss argues that compliance should not be assumed.
She also claims that analyzing the extent to which it occurs
requires conceptual separation of three different inquiries.
- Deciding Which Strategies Best Secure Compliance (Myths
Three, Five, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen): Professor Brown Weiss
discusses which strategy of ensuring compliance with agreements works best in individual circumstances, focusing on the
obligations incorporated in agreements and the measures available to ensure compliance with them; she also argues that a
"one size fits all" approach to compliance is inappropriate.
- Evaluating Specific Compliance Strategies (Myth Six): Professor Brown Weiss assesses the utility of reporting requirements in international environmental agreements; this, of
course, is related to the inquiry above but important in its own
right.
a. Evaluating Compliance Through Separate Inquiries About
"Implementation," "Compliance," and "Effectiveness" (Myths One
and Two)
Professor Brown Weiss immediately refutes the classical
notion that countries always comply with international agreements. She argues that the reality of compliance is a very different matter; "compliance," she has noted previously, "is a
complex process."201 It cannot be judged as a choice of extremes: while "no country complies fully with all its international legal obligations," it is not the case either that states fail to
comply at all. 202 Of particular note is that the success of compliance depends on a country's "capacity to comply," meaning
(among other things) the relative technical and legal expertise
of actors in the system. 203 Scholars often assume that nations

201. Id. at 297.
202. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1560.
203. Id.; see id. at n.17.
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have equal and constant capacities to comply with agreements.204 This assumption, according to Professor Brown
Weiss, is erroneous. Moreover, the degree of compliance not
only differs among nations, but varies over time because it depends on factors subject to change; for example, "there is a
general trend toward increased compliance by states the longer
the agreement is in effect."205
Having demonstrated the complexities of deciding whether
nations comply with agreements, Professor Brown Weiss next
offers an analytical framework for evaluating compliance. She
argues that "implementation," "compliance," and "effectiveness"
are not the same, but rather different concepts that must be
addressed separately. 206 She touches briefly on implementation-"the actions taken to give effect to the domestic obligations of the agreement"-and then shows that compliance is
broader than both "implementation" and "enforcement" because
it requires an evaluation of three separate but related issues:207 compliance with procedural duties such as submitting
annual reports; compliance with substantive obligations of
agreements (e.g., the Montreal Protocol's requirement of phasing out CFCs by the year 2000); and "compliance with the spirit of the agreement."208 Finally, Professor Brown Weiss cautions that effectiveness and compliance should be evaluated
separately. Using the example of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), she argues that
deciding whether an agreement is "effective" in meeting its
stated or unstated goals "is not necessarily correlated with
compliance."209 Decoupling the two concepts implies that an
agreement might be judged as effective without full compliance

204. See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shiliata, Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance
with International Environmental Agreements-Practical Suggestions in Light of the
World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 39 (1996).
205. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1561; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening
National compliance, supra note 80, at 297.
206. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1562-63.
207. Id. at 1562; see id. at 1562-63; cf. Sands, supra note 71, at 53 (noting that
"state compliance requires action in three ways: it must adopt national enabling legislation, policies and programmes; it must ensure compliance within its jurisdiction and
control; and it must fulfil any obligations to the appropriate international institutions,
such as reporting the national measures taken to give effect to the obligations").
208. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1563 (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 1564.
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by actors in the system, which is on its face a remarkable but
appropriate conclusion.
b. Assessing the Efficacy of Strategies to Achieve Compliance
(Myths Three, Five, Ten, Eleven, and Thirteen)
Beginning with Myth Three, and continuing throughout the
rest of her article, Professor Brown Weiss tackles a subject that
has occupied both domestic and international lawyers for decades. The core question is almost deceptively simple: which
strategies are best for ensuring that nations comply with agreements? To address this question, Professor Brown Weiss considers, in turn, traditional assumptions relating to important
subparts of this inquiry: whether agreements should feature
binding or non-binding obligations (Myth Three); whether these
obligations should be defined precisely or more generally (Myth
Five); whether formal dispute resolution processes are important (Myth Ten); whether coercive measures such as sanctions
are essential to deal with situations of noncompliance (Myth
Eleven); and finally, whether compliance strategies should apply
uniformly (Myth Thirteen).
Her insights with respect to Myths Three, Five, and Eleven
challenge several assumptions about international environmental agreements: that they must feature concretely defined, binding obligations, backed by the threat of negative incentives such
as "sanctions (military or economic), penalties, and measures
such as withdrawing membership privileges under the agreement"210 to secure compliance. She concludes that non-binding
obligations-even if described generally in an agreement-have
numerous benefits. They "create expectations that may shape
behavior and avoid disputes," often lead to binding obligations
later, "provide flexibility to adapt to changing conditions," and
"send important signals about how countries are expected to
behave."211 She finds that, "under some circumstances
nonbinding instruments may be complied with as well as bind' ing ones."212 Regarding the utility of formal dispute resolution,
Professor Brown Weiss concludes that while "[m]any interna-

210. Id. at 1584.
211. Id. at 1567, 1568, 1569 (footnote omitted).
212. Id. at 1570.
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tional environmental agreements provide for formal dispute
settlement procedures," in practice "the parties have never
invoked the formal dispute settlement procedures contained in
most . . . agreements" and resolve their disputes in less formal
fora such as meetings of the parties to an agreement. 213
As for coercive measures, Professor Brown Weiss observes
that "the historical record indicates that states have not relied
upon coercive measures to secure compliance with international
environmental agreements."214 However, she notes that the
option of sanction-based enforcement may be necessary if parties are likely to disobey an agreement; they are "particularly
useful for countries whose intention to comply is weak or who
face strong domestic pressures to lapse into noncompliance. "215
In her view, there are three distinct types of strategies to ensure compliance: coercive measures, technical and financial
incentives, and "sunshine" strategies. 216 "Sunshine" mechanisms could include the following techniques, many of which
will be familiar to domestic environmental lawyers: "reporting,
on-site monitoring, NGO participation, public access to information, transparency in decision making, public information
measures such as newsletters, local community involvement,
industry monitoring, and persuasion by parties and secretariats."211

The importance of sunshine strategies cannot be overlooked;
Professor Brown Weiss states that, "[i]nternational environmen-

213. Id. at 1581, 1582 (footnote omitted); see also Fitzmaurice, supra note 14, at
399 (stating that there is a trend in international environmental law "to lead away
from traditional, adversarial systems of dispute settlement, towards, for instance, noncompliance procedures . . . or, in the case of the Court, towards a more widespread
use of advisory competence"). Cf. Sands, supra note 31, at 1639-40 (stating that
if states want international adjudicatory mechanisms, they do not seem
to want those that apply a contentious and conflictual procedure to environmental matters. So, for example, in the field of ozone depletion, and
soon also in other areas such as cliniate change and sulphur pollution,
states are putting in place noncontentious procedures that are characterized by having more of an administrative function.)
214. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1586.
215. Id.; cf. Danish, supra note 85, at 802 (citing to arguments made by George
Downs and his co-authors about the utility of coercive measures).
216. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1588.
217. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299.
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tal agreements rely primarily on sunshine methods and ince:c.tives. "218 Another commentator calls for a "social enforcement"
approach to compliance: a middle ground that incorporates features of a sanction-based approach and sunshine measures. 219
The sunshine strategy, as this commentator and others have
observed, depends largely on a nation's "reputation" in the
international community.22° Coercion is therefore inappropriate
for a variety of reasons. It is a blunt instrument that is "as
likely to undermine a treaty regime as to preserve it."221
Moreover, measures such as sanctions are not a realistic option
for most nations because often only powerful nations can resort
to them. 222
For all of these reasons, no compliance strategy will work
alone. This leads Professor Brown Weiss to her conclusion
about Myth Thirteen: compliance cannot be structured the same
way for each nation. A "mix of compliance strategies needs to
be available for each agreement," and the mix needs to be

218. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1588; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening
National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299 (sunshine methods are "the key way of
insuring compliance" in international environmental law); Danish, supra note 85, at
795-96; Farber, supra note 16, at 1314 (discussing ABRAM: CHAYES & ANToNIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995), Professor Farber contends that "formal enforcement is of limited
efficacy, whereas various informal types of pressure to conform with international
norms may have more influence"); Shiliata, supra note 204, at 41-42 (terming consensual measures the optimal means for achieving sustainable development).
Critics of Professor Brown Weiss's position point to the observed high rates of
compliance with agreements that feature binding obligations. These statistics, however, can be misleading. See David G. Victor, The Use and Effectiveness of Non-Binding
Instruments in the Management of Complex International Environmental Problems, in
Compliance with International Environmental Treaties: The Empirical Evidence, supra
note 81, at 241 (noting that "compliance with legally binding agreements has been
high, but that often the influence of binding commitments on behavior is low").
219. See Danish, supra note 85, at 804.
220. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299;
Farber, supra note 16, at 1315 (quoting the Chayeses); cf. Lakshman Guruswamy,
Book Review, 91 AM. J. lNT'L L. 207, 209 (1997) (reviewing RONALD B. MlTcHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA (1994) (clainring that "international law does invoke compliance because it governs a law-abiding community of States, not a gang of
bandits or bank robbers"). Professor Koh notes that this view evokes themes about
domestic law that Professor Chayes develops in his classic book about domestic legal
process. See Koh, supra note 84, at 2638.
221. Danish, supra note 85, at 797; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening National
Compliance, supra note 80, at 302.
222. See Danish, supra note 85, at 797.
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structured differently for each nation: "[t]he particular mix of
compliance strategies needed to induce compliance with a specific agreement will vary according to the profile of a state's
intent and capacity to comply with the agreement."223 Moreover, constant attention needs to be paid to the variables of
intent and capacity. Even if the country was able to comply at
first, it may be unable to do so later: bureaucratic structures,
technical and financial resources, and other assets necessary for
compliance can evolve over time, and not always for the better.224 Professor Brown Weiss has concluded in her previous
work that· only careful research can tell us what methods are
best for ensuring compliance with any given agreement. 225 The
bottom line is considerably different from a lawyerly reliance on
coercion: innovative thinking, not a simple reliance on negative
incentives, is required to effectuate compliance, and actors'
intent and capacity to comply must be considered in developing
compliance strategies.
c. Assessing the Utility of Reporting Requirements (Myth Six)
Professor Brown Weiss makes several interesting points
about a specific type of "sunshine" measure that has ''become
customary . . . in nearly all new international environmental
agreements:"226 the requirement to file regular reports with
treaty secretariats. The reporting requirement has many salutary features. The process of requiring the accumulation of
information for and the drafting of reports can educate parties
about the agreement, help ''build local capacity to comply with
the substantive obligations in the treaty," and serve as an important tool for monitoring compliance.227 But these require223. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1588.
224. See id.
225. See Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 298.
226. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574.
227. Id.; see also Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80,
at 299.
In certain instances, NGOs have a more direct role in generating and using the
information from the parties about their obligations under particular agreements.
Professor Brown Weiss notes that the World Conservation Monitoring Unit tracks the
reports made under CITES and provides extensive information about the status of
each endangered species. See BROWN WEISS, supra note 157, at 983; see also Cathr.rine L. Krieps, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species Under CITES: Is it a Sustainable Alternative?, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461 (1996).
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ments are not without their disadvantages. Because incompleteness and inaccuracies in reports is likely to be endemic,228
there must be a review process capable of highlighting violations.229 AB Professor Brown Weiss observed in the seminar
course, this is often lacking in the international setting: international bodies are often reluctant to call nations on the carpet
to account for violations of reporting requirements (particularly
inaccuracies in reports).
In the seminar course and in her article, Professor Brown
Weiss discusses two reasons why inadequate reporting takes
place, the first of which is the phenomenon of "reporting congestion."230 Numerous international environmental agreements
contain reporting requirements. Nations are signatories to multiple agreements, so national, state, and local officials will be
devoting precious time responding to these requirements. In a
nation with limited technical and scientific expertise, this increases the potential for inaccuracy or incompleteness. 231 The
second problem involves the logistical difficulties inherent in assembling the information required for reports. In the seminar
class, Professor Brown Weiss discussed the annual report required under CITES, which requires the aggregation of such
data as identification of species on export-import permits generated by nations around the world in a non-standardized fashion. Given these logistical difficulties, it is not surprising that

228. The Brown Weiss-Jacobson study found a range of rates of compliance with
reporting requirements. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1575. Other empirical
studies have reached similar conclusions. A study by the United States General Accounting Office and a study conducted for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements have both found that "the proportion of states rigorously complying with reporting requirements was disappointingly low." See Shiliata, supra note 204, at 43.
229. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574; see also Victor, supra note 218, at
248.
230. Brown Weiss, Strengthening National Compliance, supra note 80, at 299. See
also Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 700; Bethany Lukitsch Hicks, Treaty Congestion
in International Environmental Law: The Need for Greater International Coordination,
32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1643 (1999) (identifying congestion in reporting requirements as
an example of "procedural" treaty congestion).
231. See Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574; see also Shiliata, supra note 204, at
43 (noting that because the number of international environmental agreements is
growing rapidly in the past two decades, reporting requirements require capacity that
nations may not have to make the reports).
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many reports are "incomplete, inaccurate, or late," and ineffective for the purpose of monitoring compliance. 232
2. Toward a New Approach to Compliance in the Domestic Setting
As in the international arena, the field is wide open for
scholars to evaluate compliance issues in the domestic setting.
The issues that Professor Brown Weiss discusses in the framework of the baker's dozen myths about compliance have received little notice from commentators writing about my area of
focus in this section: the set of state and federal policies intended to expedite the remediation and redevelopment of ''brownfields" sites (abandoned or underutilized urban sites that sit
idle in part due to concerns over environmental contamination). 233 The primary initiators of brownfields laws have been
the states.234 Since 1988, almost forty states have developed
voluntary cleanup programs (VCPs) through statutory and regulatory reforms intended to speed up the cleanup of brownfields
sites.235 The federal government has been active as well.

Many (including me) have spilled considerable ink assessing
the wisdom of federal and state brownfields policies,236 but

232. Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1574 (footnote omitted).
233. See Robert H. Abrams, Comment, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields,
21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REY. 265, 273 (1997) (discussing characteristics
of brownfields sites); see also William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REY. 1, 4
n.1 (1997) (setting forth a similar definition of brownfields); Eisen, supra note 186;
Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields Zoning and Federal Enterprise Zoning, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with author) (discussing the relationship between brownfields policies and enterprise zone
laws and policies).
234. See Eisen, supra note 186, at 914-15 n.153; see also Buzbee, supra note 233,
at 27-46 (describing "first mover" dynamics to explain how states came to take the
lead in brownfields law and policy); Wolf, supra note 233 (manuscript at 12-14);
Abrams, supra note 233, at 284-87 (discussing the evolution of Michigan's brownfields
program).
235. Since I last counted the number of states with formal voluntary cleanup programs, see Eisen, supra note 186, at 1033-39, a number of states have either amended or established voluntary cleanup programs. See generally 2 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND
PRACTICE (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1998) (listing and describing the features of state
programs).
236. See Robert S. Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting
the Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69 (1995); Jane F.
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few have devoted much attention to mechanisms designed to
ensure the long-run protectiveness of brownfields cleanups. In
part, of course, this is because this area of environmental law
is new. Many state brownfields programs came into existence in
the mid- to late 1990s, and few have a track record of successful cleanups spanning five or more years. 237 I suggest a transformation similar to that occurring in international environmental law is imminent: less attention will be paid to justifying the
laws; more to evaluating their efficacy. When we do get around
to addressing those complicated questions, it would be wise to
turn to Professor Brown Weiss's article.
Professor Brown Weiss offers insights about "what drives
relevant actors, including private multi-national corporations,
non-governmental organizations, and governments, to 'give effect' to international law."238 There is a universal quality to
her conclusions about this broad theme that prompts us to
refrain from dismissing the study as limited to international
environmental law. Of course, there are considerable differences
between the domestic and international settings, particularly
the entrenched enforcement-driven nature of most of our enviClokey, Wisconsin's Land Recycling Act: From Brownfield to Greenfield, 2 WIS. ENVTL.
L.J. 35 (1995); Steven F. Fairlie, The New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's
Guide to Recycling Old Industrial Sites, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'¥ 77 (1996);
James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup and Inner City Jobs:
Indiana's Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43 (1994); David B. Hawley,
Note, The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997: North Carolina Creates an Additional Incentive to Reclaim Contaminated Properties, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1015 (1998); Peter K Johnson, Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: 1997 Superfund Amendments:
Will it Solve the Liability Problem and How Will This Affect Massachusetts?, 31 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 1269 (1997); Thomas G. Kessler, Comment, The Land Recycling and

Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pennsylvania Tells CERCLA Enough Is
Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161 (1997); Tara Burns Koch, Comment, Betting on
Brownfields - Does Florida's Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into
Opportunity?, 28 STETSON L. REV. 171 (1998); Eric D. Madden, Comment, The Voluntary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment Act-The Limits of the Kansas
Brownfields Law, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 593 (1998); Daniel Michel, Comment, The
CERCLA Paradox and Ohio's Response to the Brownfield Problem: Senate Bill 227, 26
U. TOL. L. REV. 435 (1995); Alexander H. Tynberg, Comment, Oregon's New Cleanup
Law: Short-Term Thinking at the Expense of Long-Term Environmental and Economic
Prosperity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 471 (1997). See generally Joel B. Eisen,
Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 Dmm ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 187 (1999).
237. For a listing of sites remediated in one of the larger state programs within
the past three years, see PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
PENNSYLVANIA'S LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM: .ANNUAL REPORT 1-3 (1998).
238. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 307-08.
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ronmental laws. The distinctions, however, are less significant
than one would think. The voluntary nature of most
brownfields programs leads the actors in the system to treat
litigation as an unwanted last resort. Variations in the cast of
characters are not as pronounced as they appear. The globalization of law means that the international environmental law
system consists increasingly of an extensive framework of interaction among nation-states, their sub-units, and private and
public sector organizations, 239 with this constant interaction
increasingly resembling that which takes place domestically.
With the appropriate caveats, therefore, one can begin to extend Professor Brown Weiss's conclusions to the compliance
setting of domestic environmental law.
a. Defining the Compliance Inquiry
As in the international setting, one cannot assume reflexively
that participants in the brownfields remediation system comply
with the laws; as Professor Farber notes, "even within a wellintegrated system such as the United States, local compliance is
not an automatic reflex."240 Indeed, Professor Brown Weiss refutes this assumption on the international level in part by
drawing an analogy to studies showing that "citizens and other
private actors do not necessarily comply fully with national,
state (province), or local laws."241 Professor Brown Weiss's insights also give us an idea of what "compliance" means in the
domestic setting. Separating implementation from compliance is
important because brownfields laws, like international environmental agreements, are not always wholly self-executing; some
state statutes require implementing measures in the form of
regulations establishing cleanup standards.242 Beyond this,
these are complex compliance issues. Consider just two of the
many issues involved in a brownfields cleanup: (1) whether the
property owner took the appropriate steps to ensure compliance
with an applicable cleanup standard, and (2) whether the owner

239.
further
240.
241.
242.
recting

See Brown Weiss, supra note 36, at 709. I discuss this "globalization" trend
in Part 11.D. infra.
Farber, supra note 16, at 1315.
Brown Weiss, supra note 22, at 1561-62.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(b)(l) (Anderson 1997) (Repl. Vol.) (dithe preparation of rules identifying appropriate cleanup standards).
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actually performed a cleanup to the appropriate level. It is not
hard to see that all three of Professor Brown Weiss's compliance subissues-procedural, substantive, and "spirit of the
agreement" concerns----are triggered by these questions.
Unfortunately, in brownfields cleanups, these compliance
issues require more attention than they have been given at
present.243 There is another inquiry that one can derive from
Professor Brown Weiss's response to Myth One. Does an individual state's program advance the goals of brownfields law and
policy? In Professor Brown Weiss's terminology that is more
properly characterized as a question of effectiveness. Even if all
participants in brownfields remediation complied substantially
with all state and federal legal requirements, that does not
necessarily mean the laws are effective. I leave further elaboration on this intriguing notion for another day.
b. Deciding on Appropriate Compliance Strategies
Which compliance strategy or strategies will prove most useful in the brownfields setting? The regulatory structure is premised on its voluntariness, so it is not immediately apparent
that sanctions are an appropriate instrument for ensuring compliance. I offer a hypothetical situation for considering a situation of potential noncompliance.
Assume a subsequent purchaser of a brownfields site first
remediated for industrial use intends to build houses on that
site. I also assume, as is often true, that a state's regulations
require additional cleanup of a brownfields site in that case for
use for residential purposes,244 and that the state could prohibit the purchaser from using the property in the desired manner without performing an additional cleanup.245 The state

243. Theoretical treatments of this issue have begun to appear. See generally Wolf,
supra note 232 (advocating a "PLUS" system to address long-term protectiven~ss at
brownfields sites). However, no empirical analysis comparable in scope to the Brown
Weiss-Jacobson study exists.
244. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3745-300-08(B)(2)(c), (B)(2)(d) (1998) (defining
"residential," "commercial," and "industrial" land uses and setting separate generic soil
cleanup standards for each, with the residential standard being the strictest); see also
Wolf, supra note 233 (manuscript at 32-34).
245. For a list of states that have adopted this approach, see Eisen, supra note
186, at 960 n.331. States also rely on private law means such as covenants recorded
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could also presumably withdraw privileges (for example, barring
the purchaser from eligibility to receive state grants or subsidies if it did not perform an adequate cleanup).
Following Professor Brown Weiss's lead, it is important to
observe that not all purchasers are alike, and not all compliance strategies should be either. 246 A hybrid "social enforcement" strategy might be better for some cases than simply
relying on sanctions alone. For example, requiring regular reports from actors and evaluating compliance through review of
those reports could be effective in the brownfields setting. The
purchaser could be required to make a comprehensive report at
the moment when the property transfer was contemplated,247
and submit periodic reports and agree to on-site inspections
after performing the cleanup.
Indeed, one might conclude that a mix of different strategies
is important precisely because no two developers of brownfields
sites are alike. Consider the variables of intent and capacity. In
my hypothetical, our subsequent purchaser may have the intent
to comply with the requirement to remediate the site to a residential cleanup standard. However, the purchaser may be unable to do so if, for example, there is lingering scientific uncertainty over key issues, such as the appropriate level of cleanup
required or the likelihood that a specified remedy might fail to
protect human health and the environment over time. 248 Relying on a reporting requirement alone may be useful in this
case; the inherent shortcomings could be dealt with by providing technical or financial assistance to the purchaser. This

with initial purchasers' deeds, but, "as every first-year property law student schooled
in the intricacies of common-law servitudes could testify, the most common form of
use restriction found in private law-the real covenant-is an eminently unwieldy and
unreliable mechanism to bind subsequent purchasers of the brownfield parcel." Wolf,
supra note 233 (manuscript at 37).
246. See also Ruhl, supra note 11, at 940 (arguing for diversity in regulatory approaches, rather than the traditional American pattern of reliance on command-andcontrol mechanisms, because we should think of environmental law as a "complex
adaptive system").
247. This is the premise underlying state property transfer statutes. See Eisen,
supra note 186, at 959-61.
248. See id. at 906-10. See generally John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable
Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 261 (1991); John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277 (1992).
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would comport with an important lesson of Professor Brown
Weiss's article: the mix of compliance measures must be designed to deal with the variety of actors in the process and the
problems inherent in securing compliance.
c. Revisiting the Reporting Requirement
In my hypothetical above, I imposed a reporting requirement
on some purchasers, and, as in the international setting, the
requirement would have many desirable features. Our historical
openness regarding information contained in the reports249
would ensure transparency and allow environmental groups to
detect noncompliance.250 So too could the exercise of meeting a
reporting obligation educate the purchaser about compliance
with brownfields cleanup requirements. However, we need to
account for some of the same problems Professor Brown Weiss
identifies, particularly "report congestion." In my hypothetical,
the subsequent purchaser may cut corners on its brownfields
cleanup report if it also has to make reports required under
other state and federal environmental laws (not to mention tax,
securities, and other laws). That this means the reporting re-

249. The information would presumably be available to non-governmental organizations under a state analogue to the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.1-340-346.1 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
250. This is comparable to Professor Bugeda's suggestion that a Mexican environmental group could use the information developed in the Cozumel Factual Record. See
supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
It would not be an entirely unknown feature in domestic environmental law, of
course, to require regular reports; consider, for example, the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act's (EPCRA) reporting requirement and the availability
of citi2en suits to enforce it. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (1994). The information accumulated in the EPA's database of information reported under EPCRA, the "Toxic
Release Inventory," has served as the basis for a number of citi2en suits. See Michael
J. Vahey, Comment, Hazardous Chemical Reporting Under EPCRA: The 7th Circuit
Eliminates the "Better Late Than Neuer" Excuse From Citizen Suits, 29 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 225 (1997). These suits are not guaranteed to succeed. Courts have recently split
on the question of whether EPCRA allows citi2ens to recover for historical violations
of EPCRA's reporting requirements. Compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996), uacated, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (allowing claims for
wholly past violations), and Vahey, supra, with Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995) (denying claims for
historical violations).
The Supreme Court recently vacated Steel Company, finding that petitioners
lacked standing to bring their action. Three Justices argued that EPCRA does not
authorize citi2en suits for historical violations. See Steel Company, 118 S. Ct. 1003.
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quirement is no panacea for effectuating compliance in the
brownfields setting is yet another important lesson to be derived from Professor Brown Weiss's analysis.

D. The Dynamic Nature of National Sovereignty and Lessons for
the Environmental Federalism Debate
AB I noted earlier, the rapid evolution of international environmental law may also offer insights about delineating the
appropriate balance of regulatory power among federal, state
and local governments. At first, it would seem that Professor
Sands' article is an unlikely place to turn for help, focusing as
it does on a theme comparable to Professor Brown Weiss's discussion of Myth Ten regarding the utility of formal dispute
resolution procedures: "[w]ith more international environmental
obligations on the horizon, now is certainly the time to start
thinking about the arrangements we wish to have in place in
the next century to help resolve the disputes that will inevitably arise."251

Professor Sands first describes the current status of international environmental litigation. He finds that existing tribunals
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European
Court of Justice, and the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization have a decidedly mixed record in terms of integrating environmental considerations into their decisions. Then,
he analyzes the recurring proposal to address perceived shortcomings of the current system by creating an international
environmental court, and concludes that "the time is clearly not
ripe to establish such a body."252 He believes the international
community should encourage litigation in existing fora, particularly by "those players most directly affected by environmental
issues," believing "[t]he time will no doubt come when these
players will gain enhanced access to the more traditional bodies."253 His article is a valuable resource for lawyers who want
to find ways to expand the traditional limited view of international environmental litigation's purpose.

251. Sands, supra note 31, at 1640; see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
252. Sands, supra note 31, at 1640.
253. Id. at 1641.
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Another way to look at his article, however, is that it illustrates the dynamic nature of the relationship between nations
and the international community. In the second part of this
section, I argue that the debate over this relationship's future
has features comparable to the environmental federalism debate
raging in the United States, and that Professor Sands offers
lessons that can translate to that debate. Before making this
argument, I begin with a summary of Professor Sands's conclusions about international environmental litigation.
1. The Future of International Environmental Litigation

Professor Sands finds that there is a "steady increase in
international environmental litigation" which will "continue"
given the rapid proliferation of international environmental
law.254 At the moment, however, there is a relatively meager
and incoherent body of case law in this field. He analyzes the
ICJ's recent cases, noting that the ICJ has little experience
with environmental disputes. As recently as 1994, he observed
that the ICJ "is yet to make a really significant contribution to
the development of international environmental law."255 Four
years later, he believes that the ICJ's treatment of three cases
(Nuclear Tests II, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, and
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros)256 has "indicated an ability to address
environmental issues, at least indirectly."257
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1625 (quoting Philippe Sands, The International Court of Justice and
the European Court of Justice, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 221 (Jacob
Werksman ed. 1996)). See also Fitzmaurice, supra note 14, at 398.
During the first four decades of the [ICJ's] existence, environmental issues hardly featured at all in the matters that came before it, and this,
despite the growing importance of environmental protection in the development of international law during the 1970s and 1980s. . . . The only
case which directly raised major environmental issues was the Nuclear
Tests I case in 1974; but the [!CJ] ignored these and rested its decision
on other grounds.
Id.
256. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1995
I.C.J. 3 (July 6) (known as Nuclear Tests II); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 809 &
1343 (1996); Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.
v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 25), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998).
257. Philippe Sands, Statement of Mr. Philippe Sands, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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In the first two of these cases, though, the ICJ "side-stepped"
important and basic issues. 258 It was therefore "possibly . . .
radical" for the ICJ even to recognize in the GabcikouoNagymaros case that emerging environmental norms and standards must be taken into account by nations, though the ICJ's
opinion hardly went as far as it could have to integrate
principles such as the precautionary principle into its decision. 259 In short,
the question arises as to whether the ICJ has missed an
opportunity to indicate a real willingness to show its environmental credentials? This is not to say that environmental concerns should have trumped all others. Certainly, the
court demonstrated an understanding of the unique difficulties presented by environmental issues, of the existence of
various standards to be applied, and of an indication as to
how these could be applied to the facts. 260

Thus, recent ICJ decisions have brought attention to environmental considerations, but "do not contribute to the much needed development of the law by way of judicial insight."261 Other
tribunals have been more successful, particularly the European
Court of Justice, which, with its "established environmental
case load of over 150 cases," constitutes "the principal driving
force in developing European Community (EC) environmental
law."262 Still others, such as the European Court of Human
Rights, 263 the International Centre for the Settlement of InICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSITY OF THE COURT 438,
439 (Connie Peck & R.S. Lee eds., 1997).
258. Sands, supra note 31, at 1629 (footnote omitted). Professor Lakshman
Guruswamy agrees with this judgment, observing that in the Nuclear Weapons Advi·
sory Opinion, the ICJ avoided the responsibility of enforcing an international environmental agreement. See also Laksman Guruswamy, Commentary of Professor
Lakshman Guruswamy, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE
THE 50TH ANNIVERSITY OF THE COURT 418, 426-27 (Connie Peck & R.S. Lee eds.,
1997).
259. Sands, supra note 31, at 1631; see id. at 1630.
260. Id. at 1633.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1626.
263. In the seminar course, Professor Sands discussed the case of Lopez Ostra v.
Spain in which the court allowed a plaintiff to bring an environmental cause of action alleging breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights, found in favor of the plaintiff for breach of Article 8, and awarded damages
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vestment Disputes, and the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, have adjudicated cases involving environmental
issues.264 With international environmental law growing rapidly, the meager record of decisions to date and the involvement
by multiple tribunals lead some to call for the establishment of
a single international environmental court:
[P]roponents of a dedicated international environmental
court or tribunal argue that existing bodies lack the requisite expertise, that the absence of a single body will lead to
a fragmentation in the application of environmental standards, and that the failure of the ICJ to play an adequate
role leaves a major gap. 265
While the ICJ's creation of an "Environment Chamber" would
appear to respond to this view, Professor Sands sees it at best
as an "effort[ ] to head off ... a new body."266
Professor Sands then discusses the wisdom of establishing
such a court. Taking up this complex question, 267 he acknowledges the range of views regarding the proper function of international adjudication,268 particularly the "two basic approachand costs and expenses. See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277, 292-98
(1995).
264. See Sands, supra note 31, at 1634; see also Shibata, supra note 204, at 45
(discussing cases decided before the ICSID).
265. Sands, supra note 31, at 1636.
266. Id. at 1640. Ibrahim Shibata of the World Bank states that the Chamber
could "bring about a greater degree of compliance with environmental obligations."
Shibata, supra note 204, at 44. Professor Sands has found this claim unpersuasive,
having observed that "the Chamber is essentially a political creation . . . . It seems
to me extremely unlikely that a case would ever get to the Chamber, unless it was
on an extremely narrow point, on the interpretation of a treaty." Sands, supra note
257, at 439.
267. Delegates at a conference held in Rome approved a treaty establishing a single permanent tribunal to deal with international offenses such as genocide and war
crimes, over the objection of the United States's delegates. See Elizabeth Neuffer, War
Crimes Tribunal Adopted As U.S. Votes "No," BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1998, at Al.
The discussion of creating a single environmental tribunal is similar to that
about the potential for creating a single global environmental regulatory body. See
Esty, supra note 14, at 112; Sir Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 282-83 (1992) (proposing the creation of
an "International Environmental Organization"); see also Brown Weiss, supra note 36,
at 699 (noting Sir Geoffrey Palmer's proposal for a "common institutional home for
international environmental agreements"). Like the idea of a single environmental
tribunal, the desire for a single supranational organization to handle environmental
issues "is not commonly shared." Shibata, supra note 204, at 42.
268. See generally Laurence R. Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory
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es" of a "minimalist" view (a tribunal should decide the precise
questions presented to it) and an expansive view (a tribunal
should fill gaps in vague international environmental treaties). 269 He then raises problems common in environmental
law both at the domestic and international level: the difficulty
of resolving competing scientific claims, the challenges of interpreting complex statutory and regulatory language, and so
forth. 270 He also introduces issues unique to international environmental law, such as the different positions of developed
and developing countries about environmental issues. 271
While Professor Sands believes that more international environmental litigation is likely, he observes that it is too soon to
establish an international environmental court. 272 He states
that nations simply do not want such a tribunal:
[S]tates are not clamoring to establish an international
environmental court. . . . [l]f states want international adjudicatory mechanisms, they do not seem to want those that
apply a contentious and conflictual procedure to environmental matters. So, for example, in the field of ozone depletion, and soon also in other areas such as climate change
and sulphur pollution, states are putting in place noncontentious procedures that are characterized by having more
of an administrative function .... a sort of international alternative dispute resolution. 273

At present, then, working with the existing system holds
more promise than creating a new court. Professor Sands observes that, "the possibility of an international environmental
court should be kept on our radar screens, but the time is
clearly not ripe to establish such a body. The very fear of its
creation may serve as an inducement for various courts to demonstrate their ability to address environmental issues."274

of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (discussing international adjudication generally, and evaluating the potential for translating European
models of transnational adjudication to other legal systems).
269. Sands, supra note 31, at 1637.
270. See id. at 1637-38.
271. See id. at 1639.
272. See id. at 1640.
273. Id. at 1639-40.
274. Id. at 1640.
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2. The Future of National Sovereignty: Parallels to the
Environmental Federalism Debate
There is additional insight to be gleaned from Professor
Sands's comments that hint at the considerable flux in the relationship between individual nations and the international community.275 Professor Sands does not suggest, as others have,
that the international environmental law regime necessarily
"portend[s] the 'demise' or even the 'end' of 'sovereignty' (at
least as traditionally conceived)."276 Instead, one can read Professor Sands's article as confirming the considerable flux in the
relationships of actors in this system. His comments about the
dynamic nature of international environmental litigation hint at
a larger tension between national sovereignty and the need to
address international environmental issues. The importance of
national sovereignty is well established in international environmental law. It finds its most notable expression in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.277

This statement has been reaffirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, "with the addition of the words 'and developmental'
after the word 'environmental,' at the insistence of various
developing economies."278 Note that this declaration still leaves

275. See id. at 1639-40; cf. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303 (noting that international environmental agreements make significant intrusions on domestic jurisdiction).
276. Alvarez, supra note 81, at 303; cf. Lynton K Caldwell, International Environ·
mental Politics: America's Response to Global Imperatives, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IN THE 1990s TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 301, 301 (Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft
eds., 1990) (stating that "[t]he concept of national sovereignty is of declining significance in a world that increasingly faces environmental problems affecting people everywhere").
277. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 42, at princ. 21.
278. Ben Boer, Environmental Law and the Law of Nature, HUMAN RESOURCES
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much room for interpretation. What actions create "damage . . .
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction?" How are these actions to be reconciled with the "sovereign right" of nations to
control their economic destinies? Which institution has responsibility for making these judgments?
Nations' reluctance to establish a single environmental court,
of course, perhaps best exemplifies the lack of resolution of this
tension. Professor Sands has noted that states balk at surrendering sovereignty to international institutions: "Sovereign interests, however, have resulted in a general unwillingness of
States to transfer much-if any-enforcement power to international institutions. This unwillingness highlights the fundamental tension between the juridical reality of States' territorial
sovereignty over their natural resources and the physical reality
of ecological interdependence."279
That "fundamental tension" is evident in the ICJ's treatment
of recent cases. The ICJ's hesitation to adopt common environmental principles evidences a considerable reluctance to submit
individual nations to the will of the international community.
Additionally, the ICJ's judgments are difficult to enforce. By
coincidence, during Professor Sands's residence in Richmond,
the ICJ heard Paraguay's request for "provisional measures"280
in the Breard case. Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national, had
been sentenced to death in Virginia for the rape and murder of
an Alexandria woman. 281 Paraguay claimed that Breard's
rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations were violated because Breard was not given an opportunity to consult with a Paraguayan consular official during his
trial. The ICJ "indicated" provisional measures, pending a decision on the merits of this claim. 282 Virginia refused to obey
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, May 1997, at 1-2.
279. Sands, supra note 71, at 55.
280. "Provisional measures" are a remedy roughly equivalent to a preliminary injunction in domestic law, and are authorized by Article 41 of the statute establishing
the International Court of Justice. They are "intended to preserve the respective
rights of the parties pending [a] decision, and [presuppose] that irreputable prejudice
shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of a dispute in judicial proceedings . . . . " International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org/Basicdoc/Basetext/istatute.htm>.
281. See Philippe Sands, An Execution Heard Round The World, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1998, at B9.
282. See International Court of Justice, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
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the provisional measures, with Governor James Gilmore claiming Virginia was not obliged to follow the ICJ order unless
ordered to do so by an American court,283 and executed
Breard. Professor Sands' comments on the Breard case (in the
seminar course and other law school fora) and the ICJ's environmental cases raise an exceedingly complex-and to date
unresolved-question about national sovereignty: in what instances should international judgments supplant individual
nations' decisions (and, in the Breard case, decisions of their
political sub-units)?284
If one were to substitute American states for nations and the

federal government for international institutions, this discussion
about sovereignty could be seen to parallel the environmental
federalism debate now raging in the United States.285 Broadly
speaking, the states see themselves as innovators and seek to
avoid federal involvement in environmental protection; the EPA
seeks to ensure federal primacy and the achievement of minimum environmental protection standards. On the surface, any
comparison to the international setting might seem unwarranted due to differences in legal and political dynamics. Domestic
(Para. v. U.S.), Request For The Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, April 9,
1998 (visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.icj-cij.org/idocket/idocket/ipauslipausframe.
htm>; see also Sands, supra note 280. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the
extensive work done by my colleague, Professor Leslie Kelleher, on this case at the
domestic level, and her involvement, together with Professor Sands and Professor
Daniel Murphy of the Law School, in a forum held during Professor Sands's visit. For
a more comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Philippe Sands, The Breard Case:
From Virginia to the Hague, 11 RICH. L. 10 (1998).
283. See Sands, supra note 281.
284. One need only contemplate the Supremacy Clause implications of a suggestion
that state and federal courts should defer to judgments of the !CJ to see the analytical quagmire ahead. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Sands, supra note 282, at
10. See generally Frank Green, Albright Asks: Stay Execution, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,
Apr. 14, 1998, at Al; Frank Green, Court Will Hear Advice on Breard Execution
Scheduled For Tomorrow Night, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 1998, at Bl (discussing the argument before the Supreme Court regarding Virginia's obligations to enforce
the !CJ order, including Supremacy Clause implications).
285.
[A] central and raging debate in environmental law focuses on the
balance of power between state and federal governments and the merit of
the system of so-called "cooperative federalism" that has been in place for
twenty-five years and under which the federal government has taken the
policy-shaping and standard-setting role for the states and their local
subdivisions.
Ruhl, supra note 11, at 981; see also Buzbee, supra note 233. Scholarly treatments of
this issue are listed in Ruhl, supra note 11, at 981 n.190.
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states and private actors face the possibility of federal retribution if they disobey their obligations (and, of course, it is precisely this fear that drives the states to call for increased autonomy). At present, nations have no such worries about the
enforcement power of any international body. 286
Professor Sands, however, reminds us that nations are increasingly entering into binding obligations, compliance with
which will have to be obtained in some fashion. He emphasizes
the need to "start thinking about the [institutional] arrangements we wish to have in place in the next century'' to handle
environmental issues. 287 Observing that there is no one optimal dispute resolution forum, he proposes instead the consideration of litigation in a variety of fora. He concludes his article
with an energetic discussion of the potential roles of a wide
range of decision making bodies, including the ICJ, Permanent
Court of Arbitration, Hamburg Tribunal, and others. 288
It is this search for a multifaceted environmental law regime
that finds a parallel on the domestic level, where scholars highlight the limitations of traditional suppositions about the federal-state relationship. Professors William Buzbee and J.B. Ruhl,
for instance, challenge rigid assumptions about federal and
state interests in environmental protection-including generalizations about state sovereignty and federal primacy-as masking the complexity of the issues and the need for diversity in
regulatory approaches.
Professor Buzbee, commenting specifically on brownfields law
and policy, observes an "institutional determinism" whereby
actors make simplistic and deterministic assumptions about
what governments and brownfields developers think and do. 289
To Professor Buzbee, determining which level of government
should make decisions such as setting brownfields policies to

286. See Sands, supra note 31; cf. Christopher D. Stone, Defending The Global
Commons, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 36 (noting that "combatting strategic
behaviour and securing cooperation in the international arena is considerably more
difficult than overcoming the analogous obstacles in domestic contexts" because in the
latter, "dissenters-potential freeriders-can be simply forced to pay their share by
law").
287. Sands, supra note 31, at 1640.
288. See id. at 1640-41.
289. See generally Buzbee, supra note 233.
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ensure subsequent purchasers' compliance with their obligations
would have a complex answer; no one single institutional option
would suffice. Similarly, Professor Ruhl's "complex adaptive
systems" theory leads him to the comparable conclusion that
traditional cooperative federalism approaches are insufficient for
the environmental law of the next century. Instead, he calls for
"nested, coupled levels of [regulatory] organization,"290 featuring both traditional forms of regulation and cooperative mechanisms such as interstate compacts.
Other writers, particularly those who favor uniform federal
environmental controls over decentralization and devolution, 291
might not view calls for webbed institutional relationships so
favorably. Professor Sands would probably disagree with this
conclusion. Like Professors Ruhl and Buzbee, he implies that
centralizing regulatory authority (in this case, judicial authority
to decide environmental cases) is not necessarily preferable at
present to a system of institutional arrangements, however
imperfect they may turn out to be. There may be a consistency
problem, as maintaining coherence among decisions of different
international tribunals 292 may be as difficult as ensuring that
fifty states' brownfields programs protect the environment. This
is a challenge to be identified and managed. Centralization in
and of itself is not the answer.

III.

CONCLUSION

The rich and varied theoretical work of the four Allen Chair
Professors demonstrates that international environmental law is
increasingly blended with its domestic counterparts. Its most
obvious link to the domestic setting is as a source of domestic
law, both directly through the requirement that domestic law
conform to international agreements, and indirectly through the
generation of first principles such as sustainable development.
More than that, however, it reinforces cherished ideals such as
public participation and, as it grows and matures into a com290. Ruhl, supra note 11, at 982.
291. See generally Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1267 (1985) (arguing in favor of uniform centralized environmental controls).
292. See Sands, supra note 31, at 1641.
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plex regulatory regime, offers insights about our own environmental law system.
Therefore, as law becomes more global, domestic actors
should pay careful attention to the growing impact of international environmental law on domestic law. The Allen Chair
Professors demonstrate that there is a wide range of benefits to
be recouped domestically from lessons learned on the world
stage.

